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ABSTRACT 
Using a broad-based test battery (i.e., the IGT, GDT, BART, and select A-DMC 
subtests), the current study comprehensively assessed decision-making performance in 
different situations (e.g., where contingencies were and were not explicit, where the 
task was administered via computer and pencil-and-paper, where higher-quality 
decision making was reflected by low risk-taking and where higher-quality decision 
making was reflected by higher risk-taking) in groups with BN and BED compared to 
each other and to controls in a sample of primarily female college students (N=111). 
Analyses were run to explore whether these difference could possibly be explained by 
differences in measures of executive function, impulsivity-related personality traits, or 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Contrary to the researchers predictions and despite 
significant between-group differences on measures of executive function, impulsivity-
related personality traits, obsessive-compulsive symptoms, depression and other 
anxiety symptoms, no significant between-group differences were identified on 
measures of decision making with the exception of the A-DMC Resistance to Framing 
subtest on which the BN group performed significantly better than controls. It should 
be noted that the majority of the analyses that were run to examine decision-making 
performance were inadequately powered to detect between-group differences had such 
differences existed. Future studies should seek to replicate these findings using larger 
samples.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Eating disorders are characterized by marked disturbances in behaviors and 
other symptoms related to eating. Anorexia nervosa (AN) and bulimia nervosa (BN) are 
often recognized as the two main diagnoses of eating disorder, although the most recent 
revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; APA, 
2013) now formally recognizes binge-eating disorder (BED) as a distinct category of 
eating disorder.  
Eating Disorders Defined 
Anorexia nervosa (AN) is uniquely characterized by dietary restriction resulting 
in the maintenance of significantly low body weight (i.e. less than minimally normal). 
AN is further characterized by an intense fear of gaining weight or recurrent behavior 
that interferes with weight gain despite low weight in addition to undue influence of 
body weight or shape on self-evaluation, distortion in body weight and shape 
experience, or denial of seriousness of low weight. Though it was included in the 
previous edition (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000), amenorrhea has been eliminated as a 
diagnostic criterion for AN in the DSM-5. AN is divided into two subtypes: restricting 
type and binge-eating/purging type. AN restricting type is a specifier used to 
2 
 
describe individuals who engage in excessive exercise, dieting, or fasting in order to 
achieve and maintain low body weight, whereas AN binge-eating/purging type is used 
to describe individuals who engage in binge eating, purging (i.e., self-induced 
vomiting, etc.) or both behaviors (APA, 2013).  
Bulimia nervosa (BN), like AN, is characterized by undue influence of body 
weight and shape on self-evaluation. This over-evaluation of weight and shape in 
individuals with BN occurs in addition to recurrent episodes of binge eating followed 
by purging (e.g., self-induced vomiting or misuse of laxatives or diuretics) or other 
inappropriate compensatory behaviors (i.e., excessive exercise or fasting) to prevent 
weight gain. Binge eating episodes are discrete periods of time in which a person 
consumes an objectively large amount of food compared to what an average person 
would eat given a similar situation and circumstances and feels a loss of control over 
their eating during this time. BN is divided into two subtypes based on the use of 
different types of inappropriate compensatory behaviors: purging type and nonpurging 
type. Purging type is a specifier used to describe individuals with BN who engage in 
purging behaviors including vomiting, which is most commonly used. Nonpurging type 
is a specifier used to describe individuals with BN who do not regularly engage in 
purging behaviors but use other inappropriate compensatory behaviors instead, 
including engaging in excessive exercise and/or fasting to prevent gaining weight. The 
DSM-5 has reduced the frequency of these bingeing and inappropriate compensatory 
behaviors from twice-weekly as specified in the DSM-IV-TR to once-weekly during 
the span of at least 3 months. Unlike individuals with anorexia nervosa (AN) who are 
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underweight (BMI < 17.5), individuals with BN maintain a body weight that is in the 
normal range for one’s age and height (Garner, 1997). 
Binge-eating disorder (BED), like BN, is characterized by recurrent binge-
eating episodes in which, during a discrete period of time, an individual consumes 
substantially more food than an average person would and feels a lack of a sense of 
control over their food consumption during this time. Unlike BN, the binge-eating 
episodes that occur in BED are not regularly followed by inappropriate compensatory 
behaviors (Danner, Ouwehand, Haaster, Hornsveld, & de Ridder, 2011). The DSM-5 
requires that, in order to meet diagnostic criteria for BED, individuals must experience 
binge-eating episodes once-weekly during the span of at least three months. The DSM-
5 includes BED as a formal eating disorder category whereas it was merely described in 
Appendix B as a category for further study in the DSM-IV-TR.  
Although AN, BN, and BED are treated as distinct diagnostic disorder 
categories in the DSM, Fairburn, Cooper, and Shafran (2003) have proposed a 
transdiagnostic model of eating disorder. Not only do individuals with BN, AN, and 
BED share characteristic clinical features (i.e. over-evaluation of weight and shape, 
dietary restraint, and binge eating and purging for some), variability in the courses of 
eating disorder symptoms (Lavender et al., 2011) and “diagnostic migration” are often 
seen when looking at eating disorder diagnoses longitudinally. Taken together, this 
information suggests that eating disorders have common mechanisms that maintain 
them that cut across DSM diagnoses (see Fairburn et al., 2003, for full review).   
Additionally,  AN, BN, and BED share fundamental similarities in that each is 
characterized by a reduced ability to effectively regulate eating behavior (Brogan, 
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Hevey, & Pignatti, 2010), and, in terms of decision making, an engagement in behavior 
that is immediately reinforcing but results in negative consequences over time (Brand, 
Franke-Sievert, Jacoby, Markowitsch, & Tuschen-Caffier, 2007; Brogan, Hevey, 
O’Callaghan, Yoder, & O’Shea, 2011 ). In AN, individuals engage in dietary restriction 
and other behaviors which are thought to reduce anxiety related to fear of gaining 
weight in the short-term but often result in deleterious physical and psychological 
consequences over time (Cavedini et al., 2004). In BN, individuals engage in binge 
eating, which is thought to be immediately reinforcing in that it may result in 
momentary alleviation of negative affect (Boeka & Lokken, 2006). Individuals with 
BN also engage in inappropriate compensatory behaviors which are thought to be 
immediately reinforcing in that they appear to reduce anxiety related to fear of gaining 
weight and may reduce physical discomfort associated with binge eating but often 
result in deleterious physical and psychological consequences over time (Boeka & 
Lokken, 2006). In BED, individuals also engage in behavior that is thought to be 
immediately reinforcing but detrimental in the long term (Danner et al., 2011). 
Specifically, while binge eating may momentarily reduce negative affect such as 
anxiety, tension, or depressed mood, it may result in negative consequences in the long 
run (Brogan et al., 2011; Svaldi, Brand, & Tuschen-Caffier, 2010) such as obesity and 
other related medical problems.       
Eating Disorder Prevalence, Correlates, and Treatment Outcomes  
Though there are some cases in males, eating disorders occur primarily in 
females. In female community samples, the lifetime prevalence is 0.9% for AN, 1.5% 
for BN, and 3.5% for BED. In women, AN and BN generally begin in adolescence or 
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young adulthood whereas the mean onset of BED is later in young adulthood. 
Comorbidity with other psychological disorders including mood, anxiety, substance-use 
disorders and other disorders related to impulse-control problems as well as personality 
pathology related to perfectionism, obsessive-compulsiveness, neuroticism, negative 
emotionality, harm avoidance, and impulsivity is common in individuals with eating 
disorders (Cassin & von Ranson, 2005; Hudson, Hiripi, Pope, & Kessler, 2007). 
Further, medical complications such as gastrointestinal disturbances, dental problems 
for those who engage in self-induced vomiting, and other complications like electrolyte 
imbalances and cardiac conditions are potentially serious consequences for individuals 
with AN and BN (Mehler, 2001; Mitchell & Crow, 2006). Also, many individuals with 
BED are either overweight or obese (Hudson et al., 2007), which may put them at a 
higher risk of other medical conditions (i.e. diabetes, cardiovascular disease, certain 
types of cancer, etc.). Individuals who suffer from disordered eating may be more likely 
to experience distress and impairment in general with many reporting at least some 
level of role impairment. However, only a minority of individuals with eating disorders 
seek treatment (Hudson et al., 2007), and, although there is variability in the outcome 
research, some studies have found that over half of individuals who seek treatment for 
an eating disorder fail to obtain full symptom remission at follow-up and many relapse 
(Helverskov et al., 2010). This seems to suggest that there is room for improvement in 
the treatment for eating disorders and for more research that seeks to inform such 
treatment. 
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Decision Making and Eating Disorders 
The research examining decision-making performance in individuals with 
eating disorders is mixed. A number of recent studies have found differences in 
decision-making performance between individuals with eating disorders as well as 
individuals who are obese and controls (e.g. Cavedini et al., 2004; Cavedini et al., 
2006; Boeka & Lokken, 2006; Brand et al., 2007; Brogan et al., 2010; Brogan et al., 
2011; Danner et al., 2011; Liao et al., 2009; Svaldi et al., 2010; Tchanturia et al., 2007). 
However, two studies did not find significant decision-making differences between 
individuals with eating disorders (AN and BN) and controls (Bosanac et al., 2007; 
Guillame et al., 2010).    
Decision Making in Groups with Anorexia Nervosa 
Cavedini et al. (2004) examined decision making using the Iowa Gambling 
Task (IGT) with a control group that consisted of women without AN and a clinical 
group of women with AN that was divided by subtype (restricting type and binge 
eating/purging type). The IGT is a computerized card task that assesses risky decision 
making in a situation where contingencies are not explicit (Bechara, Damasio, Damsio, 
& Anderson, 1994). Participants begin the task with a small amount of play money. 
They are instructed to maximize their money by selecting cards one at a time from 4 
different decks of cards (A, B, C, and D) and are told that some decks are better than 
others. Each deck produces different distributions of monetary gains and losses. Decks 
A and B are considered disadvantageous because, while they have high expected gains, 
they have infrequent but high losses that give them an overall negative expected value. 
Decks C and D are considered advantageous as they have lower gains per trial but low 
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losses that give them an overall positive expected value (Cavedini et al., 2004). Thus, 
negative net values reflect a tendency to make poor decisions while positive net values 
reflect a tendency to make good decisions (Davis et al., 2010).    
As was predicted by Cavedini et al. (2004), the group with AN performed 
significantly worse than the control group without AN on the IGT, producing a lower 
net score. Though the group with AN performed more poorly on the IGT compared to 
the control group and displayed a preference for the disadvantageous decks overall, 
their strategy as the task progressed did not differ significantly from that used by the 
control group. However, the different AN subtypes used different strategies as the task 
progressed: AN-restricting participants demonstrated an increasing preference for the 
disadvantageous decks while the AN-binge/purge participants displayed a more random 
decision-making performance in which neither type (e.g., disadvantageous or 
advantageous) of deck was favored. No significant correlations were found between 
total Yale-Brown-Cornell Eating Disorder Scale (YBC-EDS; Mazure, Halmi, Sunday, 
Romano, & Einhorn, 1994) scores, a measure of eating disorder symptom severity, or 
Body Mass Index (BMI), a measure of AN illness severity, and IGT performance 
among the group with AN, suggesting that AN symptom and illness severity is not 
related to decision-making performance. Further, significant differences were not found 
between the group with AN and the control group on neuropsychological tests that 
assess basic cognitive functions other than decision making including the Weigl’s 
Sorting Test (Weigl, 1941), a measure of strategy-shifting ability, the Object 
Alternation Task (Freedman, 1990), a measure of one’s ability to find a strategy by 
using feedback received, and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Bergh, 1948), a 
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measure of cognitive strategy-shifting ability in a situation with a changing criterion. 
These results suggest that the poor decision-making demonstrated by the group with 
AN was not solely the result of a general cognitive deficit. Mood was not assessed in 
this study on the basis that some previous studies (e.g., McDowell et al., 2003) suggest 
that depressed mood does not impair cognitive function in individuals with AN. The 
authors suggest that the behavior employed by patients with AN is similar to that 
employed by patients with OCD (i.e., engaging in compulsions that reduce anxiety 
generated by obsessions which is reinforcing in the short-term but produces long-term 
negative consequences) (Cavedini et al., 2004).       
In a continuation of this research, Cavedini et al. (2006) conducted a 
prospective study examining decision making prior to and following treatment in a 
clinical sample of women with AN. The female patients with AN were administered 
either cognitive-behavioral treatment alone or a combination of cognitive-behavioral 
and drug treatment (e.g. SSRIs). The group with AN performed significantly worse 
than the control group on the IGT at admission and post-treatment, and both the control 
group and the group with AN did not show significant improvement at discharge. The 
authors proposed that the fact that the AN group’s decision-making performance did 
not improve after treatment may suggest that the decision-making impairment that was 
seen in the group with AN is not due to the effects of starvation and instead may be a 
trait condition (Cavedini et al., 2006). However, it should be noted by the reader that, as 
of yet, there are no treatments that have received strong empirical support (as defined 
by Chambless et al., 1998) for adults with AN, and the research supporting the use of 
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cognitive- behavioral therapy for acute weight gain in adults with AN is controversial 
(see McIntosh et al., 2005), which makes it difficult to assess such a conclusion. 
Tchanturia et al. (2007) conducted a study examining the relationship between 
decision making and skin conductance responses (SCRs), which assess emotional or 
physiological arousal, in female patients with AN compared to women recovered from 
AN (ANR) and healthy controls (HC) using the IGT. The group with AN performed 
significantly worse overall on the IGT compared to the ANR and HC groups, and the 
ANR and HC groups performed similarly on the task. This finding is somewhat 
contrary to the results of Cavedini et al. (2006), who found that the decision-making 
performance of patients with AN did not improve post-treatment, and seems to suggest 
that the poor decision making demonstrated by the group with AN may be a state 
condition. Further, while the ANR and HC groups learned to avoid the disadvantageous 
decks, the performance of the group with AN did not improve as the task progressed. 
Additionally, the group with AN generated significantly lower anticipatory SCRs on 
both high and low-risk decks than the HC group throughout the task, but no significant 
differences were found in SCR between the AN and ANR groups and the HC and ANR 
groups. Anticipatory SCRs prior to the selection of high and low-risk cards were found 
to be positively correlated with IGT (e.g. lower anticipatory SCRs were related to lower 
IGT performance). Thus, the authors suggest that reduced anticipatory SCR may be 
related to the poor decision-making performance demonstrated by the group with AN 
(Tchanturia et al., 2007).     
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Decision Making in Groups with Bulimia Nervosa 
Boeka and Lokken (2006) conducted a study examining decision making and 
BN using a sample of college women that was divided into a control group, which 
included participants with minimal or no eating disorder symptomology, and a group 
with BN, which included participants with a current or past BN diagnosis. When 
matched for age, level of education, and verbal intelligence, women in the group with 
BN performed significantly worse than the control group on the Iowa Gambling Task 
(IGT), showing preference for the disadvantageous decks. Unlike in the studies 
conducted by Cavedini et al. (2004, 2006), eating disorder symptom severity as 
measured by the Eating Disorders Examination Questionnaire (EDE-Q) and the 
Bulimia Test Revised (BULIT-R) was found to be negatively correlated with 
performance on the IGT. Lastly, while the group with BN was found to have 
significantly higher scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) compared to the 
control group as was expected, performance on the BDI-II was not found to be 
correlated with performance on the IGT. This, according to the authors, made 
controlling for depression symptoms when comparing the two groups unnecessary 
(Boeka & Lokken, 2006).   
Brand et al. (2007) conducted a study examining decision making in BN with an 
all-female clinical sample using the Game of Dice Task (GDT). Similar to the IGT, the 
GDT is a computerized task that assesses decision making under risk. This task differs 
from the IGT, however, in that it assesses decision making in a situation where 
consequences are explicit. Participants begin the task with a small loan of play money 
and are instructed to guess the number that comes up on each of 18 throws of a die. The 
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participants are shown a display that contains 1 row of single numbers depicted on a 
die, 1 row of two numbers depicted on two dice, one row of three numbers depicted on 
three dice, and one row of four numbers depicted on four dice (see Figure 1 from Brand 
et al. (2007)). Alternatives contain a single number or a combination of two, three, and 
four numbers, and each alternative is related to a different gain/loss amount that 
remains fixed and visible to the participant at all times throughout the task. Further, 
those numbers/combinations of numbers having a lower probability of being rolled are 
associated with higher gain, but also with a higher loss (e.g., single number options are 
associated with a higher gain/loss than combinations with two numbers, etc.). 
Therefore, the amount of risk can be reasoned by the participant for each trial. Single 
numbers and combinations of two numbers are considered disadvantageous or “risky” 
as they are associated with frequent high losses and infrequent high gains (<50% 
probability of winning money). Combinations of three or four numbers are considered 
advantageous or “non-risky” in that they are associated with a higher probability of 
gain (>50% probability of winning money) over the long run. The authors also 
administered several tests of executive function that included the Color-Word 
Interference Test, Trail Making Test (TMT), Nelson’s Modified Card Sorting Test, and 
the Tower of Hanoi (Brand et al., 2007).  
As the authors predicted, the performance of the group with BN on the GDT 
was significantly lower than that of the control group as demonstrated by more risky 
decisions. In the group with BN, psychiatric symptoms as measured by the Symptom 
Checklist (Franke, 2002) and personality traits as measured by the Freiburg Personality 
Inventory (Fahrenberg, Hampel, & Selg, 2001) and the Neuroticism scale (including 
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the Impulsiveness subscale) of the NEO Personality Inventory-Revised (Ostendorf & 
Angleitner, 2003) were not found to be significantly related to decision making. 
Interestingly, the Impulsiveness subscale score of the Neuroticism scale, while 
significantly higher in the group with BN compared to the control group, was not 
correlated with GDT performance in the BN group but was correlated with GDT 
performance in the control group. The authors suggest that the significantly higher 
mean impulsivity score of the group with BN compared to the control group may 
indicate a relationship between impulsivity and decision making that is not necessarily 
linear nor reflected by the correlations in the group with BN. It was found that patients 
with BN who took longer for the interference sheet of the Color Word Interference Test 
or the Trail Making Test (TMT) Part B, both executive function tasks, made more 
disadvantageous selections on the GDT, which suggests that executive function may be 
related to decision-making impairment in individuals with BN (Brand et al., 2007).  
Decision Making in Binge-Eating Disorder and Obesity 
Svaldi et al. (2010) conducted a study examining decision making in binge- 
eating disorder (BED) using an all-female clinical sample. The study consisted of a 
group with BED and an overweight control group (BMI >25) that both were 
administered the GDT. In addition, participants were given the TMT (Parts A and B), a 
measure of executive function. As was predicted by the authors, the group with BED 
performed significantly worse on the GDT compared to the overweight control group, 
as evidenced by a lower net score on the task. Further, the group with BED was found 
to advantageously utilize feedback less compared to the overweight control group. 
Specifically, the group with BED was found to change their game strategy significantly 
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less than controls in response to negative feedback following a “risky” selection. Also, 
the group with BED continued in the selection of a “safe” alternative in response to 
positive feedback following a “safe” choice significantly less than the overweight 
control group. Interestingly, contrary to the authors’ prediction, the group with BED 
was found to seek fun less and was less reward-responsive, as measured by the 
Behavioral Approach System (BAS) reward responsiveness subscale, than the 
overweight control group. No relationship was found between eating pathology and 
GDT performance in this study. However, the group with BED was found to have 
overall reduced executive function (TMT Part B-TMT Part A/ TMT Part A) and 
reduced cognitive flexibility specifically (lower score on the TMT Part B) compared to 
the overweight control group. The authors suggest that reduced executive function may 
contribute to impaired decision making in BED (Svaldi et al., 2010).   
Davis et al. (2010) conducted a study to examine decision making and ability to 
delay gratification in women with BED compared to obese and normal weight controls 
without BED using an all-female clinical sample. The participants were administered 
the IGT and the Delay Discounting Task. The Delay Discounting Task (Richards, 
Mitchell, de Wit, & Seiden, 1997; Richards, Zhang, Mitchell, & de Wit, 1999) is a 
computerized task that measures delay of gratification (i.e., value of immediate rewards 
relative to delayed rewards). In this task, participants are asked different questions 
addressing whether they would prefer a small amount of money immediately (e.g. $65) 
or a larger amount of a money after a delay (e.g. $100): there are 5 delay periods (2, 30, 
180, 365, and 730 days) that are assessed. Individuals who are less able to delay 
gratification show a tendency to prefer less money immediately as opposed to waiting a 
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certain number of days to receive a higher amount of money, especially as the delay 
period increases (Davis et al., 2010).  
The obese control group and the group with BED performed significantly worse 
on the IGT compared to the normal weight control group. The obese control group and 
the group with BED also performed more poorly on the Delay Discounting Task, 
discounting larger future rewards in favor of smaller rewards that were more 
immediate, than the normal weight control group. Overall, compared to the normal 
weight control group, the performances of the obese control group without BED and 
the group with BED were not significantly different on the two measures (IGT and 
Delay Discounting Task). However, a major confounding variable was significant 
differences in education level among the groups. The normal weight control group had 
a much higher level of education, and when an ANOVA was run adding education 
level as a main-effect variable in the design, the group differences were no longer 
found to be statistically significant for either the IGT or the Delay Discounting Task 
(Davis et al., 2010). This suggests that the group differences on the IGT and the Delay 
Discounting Task may have been mediated by differences in educational level. 
However, a recent study by Danner et al. (2011) which did control for education 
level found significant decision-making differences as measured by the IGT between a 
group with BED and a normal weight group as well as between an obese group without 
BED and the normal weight group. No significant decision-making differences between 
these two groups (BED and obese group without BED) were found though. Further 
analysis found that the performance of normal weight women on the IGT improved 
over time, but the performance of obese women without BED and women with BED 
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did not. This suggests that women with BED and obese women without BED may 
share a decision-making impairment in decision-making situations where the 
consequences are not explicit (e.g. IGT). The authors also found a negative correlation 
between binge-eating disorder severity as measured by the Binge Eating Scale (BES) 
and performance on IGT in that IGT performance decreased as binge-eating disorder 
severity increased. They also found a negative correlation between BMI and IGT 
performance in that, as BMI increased, IGT performance decreased. Lastly, a 
correlation between sensitivity to punishment as measured by the Behavior Inhibition 
Scale (BIS) and IGT performance was found in that participants with lower sensitivity 
to punishment performed more poorly on the IGT. Binge-eating severity was positively 
correlated with BMI and lower sensitivity to punishment (Danner et al., 2011).  
Brogan et al. (2011) conducted a study examining decision making in obese 
participants compared to normal weight controls using a male and female clinical 
sample. The participants were administered the IGT. As predicted by the authors, the 
obese group performed significantly worse overall than the control group on the 
decision-making task. Further, although the control group demonstrated an increasing 
preference for the advantageous deck as the task progressed, the obese group failed to 
demonstrate this same learning. Instead, the obese group did not demonstrate a clear 
preference for either type of deck (e.g., disadvantageous or advantageous), suggesting 
that the impaired performance on the IGT was not due to impulse control. Performance 
on the IGT was not related to eating pathology for the obese group, the comparison 
group, or the sample as a whole. Further, impulsivity as measured by the Consideration 
of Future Consequences (CFC) scale (Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 
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1994) was not related to IGT performance in the obese group. Though executive 
functioning was not measured in this study, the authors suggest that the lack of 
correlation between decision-making deficits and eating pathology may indicate that 
reduced executive functioning may be behind the poor decision making of the obese 
group. They suggest that future studies should be conducted to assess the role of 
executive functioning in decision making of obese individuals (Brogan et al., 2011). 
Decision Making in Both Groups with Anorexia and Groups with Bulimia 
Liao et al. (2009) conducted a study examining decision making using a clinical 
sample of women with BN and a control group (AN patient data from a previously 
published study (Tchanturia et al., 2007) was also used for comparative purposes). All 
three groups had been administered the IGT, and skin conductance response (SCR) 
measurements were taken while subjects performed the task. These SCR measurements 
were used as an index of somatic/emotional responding prior to making high risk 
decisions (anticipatory SCR) and after seeing the result of one’s card selection 
(response SCR) (Liao et al., 2009).  
Overall, in line with the researchers’ prediction, both the group with AN and the 
group with BN scored significantly lower than the control group on the IGT. While the 
controls learned to avoid the disadvantageous decks during the task, the groups with 
AN and BN did not, suggesting that the clinical groups were impaired in learning to 
advantageously use feedback to guide decision making in an ambiguous situation like 
the IGT. However, while the group with AN generated significantly lower levels of 
anticipatory and response SCR measurements during the IGT than controls, which is 
consistent with the findings of Tchanturia et al. (2007), the group with BN scored 
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similarly to the control group. These results suggest that the poor IGT performance of 
the group with AN may be influenced by a lack of somatic arousal but that somatic 
arousal does not seem to drive the poor decision-making performance of the group with 
BN. No correlation was found between the Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS; Patton, 
Stanford, & Barratt, 1995), a measure of impulsivity, and IGT performance. One 
subscale (e.g. doubts about action) of the Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale 
(FMPS; Frost, Marten, Lahart, & Rosenblate, 1990), a measure of perfectionism, was 
significantly negatively correlated with IGT performance. Finally, obsessive-
compulsive symptoms as measured by the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (OCI; Foa, 
Kozak, Salkovskis, Coles, & Amir, 1998) were found to be significantly negatively 
correlated with IGT performance. However, the relationships between obsessive-
compulsive symptoms and decision-making performance were not examined separately 
for each group. Instead, a correlation was run using all of the groups combined. The 
authors suggest that it is possible the obsessive-compulsive symptoms, which are 
common in individuals with eating disorders, may be behind the poor IGT performance 
of the AN and BN groups (Liao et al., 2009).       
Brogan et al. (2010) conducted a study looking at decision making in AN, BN, 
and obesity with an all-female clinical sample using the IGT. This study is an 
improvement over previous research in that it was the first to compare multiple eating-
disordered groups: AN, BN, and obese patients. Significant decision-making 
differences were found in the groups with AN, BN and obesity compared to the control 
group. All three groups performed more poorly than the control group as demonstrated 
by a lower net score and failure to learn to choose from the advantageous decks during 
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the IGT. No significant differences were found between the clinical groups (AN, BN, 
or obese) though, suggesting that a decision-making deficit is common to these groups 
(Brogan et al., 2010).       
Bosanac et al. (2007) conducted a study examining executive function, memory, 
and visuospatial functioning in underweight and “weight-recovered” female patients 
with AN and female patients with BN compared to a normal control group. In this 
study, decision making was also assessed using the IGT. Contrary to the results of a 
number of other studies (Boeka & Lokken, 2006; Brand et al., 2007; Brogan et al., 
2010; Cavedini et al., 2004; Cavedini et al., 2006; Liao et al., 2009), the groups with 
AN and BN did not perform significantly different from the normal control group on 
decision making as measured by the IGT although the clinical groups trended toward 
lower scores. The authors suggest that this discrepancy may have been due to low 
statistical power resulting in increased likelihood of Type II error in their study 
compared to previous studies with more participants. Specifically, while at least 20 
participants per group were needed in order to achieve a desired power of .80, groups 
of 16 or less participants were used in this study (e.g. AN group= 16, BN=13, NC= 16) 
(Bosanac et al., 2007). In other words, this study appeared to have lacked adequate 
ability to detect between group differences had these differences existed. There have 
been a number of studies that have used larger groups, many with groups of more than 
20 participants, that have found differences between groups with AN and BN and 
groups without eating disorders (Boeka & Lokken, 2006; Brand et al., 2007; Brogan et 
al., 2010; Cavedini et al., 2004; Cavedini et al., 2006; Liao et al., 2009).         
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Guillame et al. (2010) conducted a study examining decision-making 
performance and eating disorders with a large clinical sample of women with AN and 
BN and a control group using the IGT. Contrary to the researchers’ prediction, the 
groups with AN and BN did not perform significantly different from the control group 
on decision making as measured by the IGT (Guillame et al., 2010).  
The authors of this study argue that this discrepancy may have been due to 
differences in patient characteristics between their study and previous studies (Guillame 
et al., 2010). While their study excluded medicated and depressed individuals on the 
basis that these variables may affect decision-making performance, there have been a 
few previous studies that did not address or control for medication and depression 
status. For example, they argue that one previous study excluded participants based on 
medication status (Cavedini et al., 2004), but some did not address medication status 
(Boeka & Lokken, 2006; Cavedini et al., 2006). In another study (Tchanturia et al., 
2007), almost half of the patients were taking SSRIs at the time of the experiment; 
however, no significant differences were found between those taking medication and 
those who were not taking medication (Tchanturia et al., 2007). Further, one study 
(Tchanturia et al., 2007), found depression scores to be significantly negatively 
correlated with decision-making performance as measured by the IGT. Some studies, 
the authors argue, do not address depression status (Cavedini et al., 2004; Cavedini et 
al., 2006). In other studies (Boeka & Lokken, 2006; Liao et al., 2009; Tchanturia et al., 
2007), the mean depression level as measured by the BDI-II was higher in ED groups 
than controls. Thus, the authors argue that depression or medication may have 
negatively impacted decision making in the clinical groups and contributed to the poor 
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IGT performance in some of these previous studies (Guillame et al., 2010).While the 
explanations proposed by Guillame et al., (2010) may be true, one could argue that 
using a euthymic and non-depressed sample of eating disorder patients only represents 
a smaller, less impaired, subset of that population and may not be generalizable to the 
larger population of individuals with eating disorders, in which a sizable portion suffer 
from depression and/or take medication. 
Limitations of Current Research 
One limitation of the existing research on decision making and eating disorders 
is that only one measure of decision making is used, most frequently the IGT (with the 
exception of Brand et al., 2007 and Svaldi et al., 2010, who used the GDT). First, using 
any single measure of decision making may be limited in comprehensively assessing 
decision making because that assumes that decision making is a unidimensional 
construct (Brogan et al., 2011). Further, using the IGT alone in evaluating decision 
making is potentially problematic in that this task assesses decision making in a 
somewhat ambiguous situation where the contingencies are not explicit (Brand et al., 
2007; Svaldi et al., 2010). Some argue that this type of decision-making situation with 
non-explicit consequences may not be similar to that experienced by individuals with 
eating disorders (Brand et al., 2007; Svaldi et al., 2010). Instead, individuals with 
eating disorders are often aware of the consequences of their behavior (e.g., individuals 
with eating disorders often recognize that their eating behaviors may likely result in 
detrimental physical and social consequences) (Svaldi et al., 2010) and that it may be 
beneficial to assess decision making in individuals with eating disorders using a task 
with explicit consequences (e.g. the GDT). Further, a study comparing decision making 
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in both situations (e.g. one with non-explicit consequences as measured with the IGT 
and explicit consequences as measured with the GDT) across groups with eating 
disorders is lacking (Brand et al., 2007). Also, lacking within the current eating 
disorder and decision-making literature is a study that examines decision making in a 
situation where higher-quality decision making is associated with higher-risk decisions 
as is the case in the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). Instead, included in the 
current research are tasks in which higher-quality decision making is associated with 
lower-risk decisions (e.g. IGT and GDT).      
   Additionally, the decision-making instruments that have been administered in 
previous studies, particularly the IGT and the GDT, are computerized tasks. Recent 
work (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007) has developed and validated a 
pencil-and-paper self-report measure of decision making: the Adult Decision-Making 
Competence (A-DMC) index. In this task, the participant is presented with a number of 
written scenarios in which they have to read and integrate information before coming to 
a decision. The Adult Decision-Making Competence (A-DMC) index appears to 
require a much greater degree of cognitive processing and working memory than the 
IGT or the BART. Van Dyke and Petros (2013) recently reported that measures of 
personality and cognition differentially predicted decision-making performance 
depending upon whether the task was administered via the computer verses via pencil-
and-paper. This highlights the need to examine decision-making performance on tasks 
that are administered through different mediums. 
.  
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Also, an overwhelming majority of the studies examining decision making and 
eating disorders have been conducted using a clinical sample with eating disorders. 
Only one of the studies reviewed (Boeka & Lokken, 2006) has been conducted using a 
college sample, a population for which eating disorders are prevalent and persistent 
(Eisenberg, Nicklett, Roeder, & Kirz, 2011). Also, lacking in the decision making and 
eating disorder literature is a study that compares BN and BED, two disorders that are 
conceptually very similar, especially BED and BN non-purging type.     
 Further, as emphasized by Guillame et al. (2010), many of these studies do not 
address obsessive-compulsive symptoms, which are prevalent in individuals with eating 
disorders and have been found to negatively impact decision-making performance on 
the IGT (Lawrence et al., 2006). Though eating disorders and obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD) are seemingly very different conditions and are categorized as such in 
the DSM-5, they both have a similar cognitive feature: repetitive thoughts and 
preoccupation with a feared stimulus. With eating disorders, the thoughts and 
preoccupations are geared toward food and body weight and shape whereas with 
obsessive compulsive disorder, the thoughts and preoccupations are primarily focused 
on checking, washing, mental neutralizing, ordering, or hoarding, etc. (Altman & 
Shankman, 2009).  
Anxiety disorders, in particular OCD, have been found to be more prevalent in 
women with eating disorders (Kaye et al., 2004). Epidemiological studies have reported 
the lifetime prevalence of OCD in individuals with BN to be between 14.3% and 17.4% 
in community samples (Angst et al., 2004; Hudson et al., 2007) and as high at 43% in 
populations with eating disorders (Godart, Flament, Perdereau, & Jeammet, 2002; 
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Swinbourne & Touyz, 2007). Further, lifetime prevalence of OCD in individuals with 
BED has been found to be 8.2% in a large community sample (Hudson et al., 2007). 
High prevalence rates of OCD in individuals with AN have been found as well (e.g. up 
to 69% in populations with eating disorders (Godart et al., 2002; Swinbourne & Touyz, 
2007)). Others studies have found a high comorbidity between obsessive-compulsive 
tendencies and disordered eating in an all-female college sample (Roberts, 2006). This 
research seems to suggest that the co-occurrence of OCD and eating disorders is not 
due to chance.  
Longitudinal studies of the comorbidity of ED and OCD suggest that the co-
occurrence of the two conditions may be due to an underlying etiological factor 
(Altman & Shankman, 2009), and studies that have found higher rates of OCD in 
relatives of individuals with AN and BN compared to controls (Lilenfeld et al., 1997, 
1998; Strober, Freeman, Lampert, & Diamond, 2007) further lend support to the notion 
that EDs and OCD share a common etiological factor. A common etiological factor that 
has been suggested is personality traits such as impulsivity and perfectionism, which 
are core personality traits shared by both individuals with EDs and OCD (Altman & 
Shankman, 2009). Gay, Rochat, Billieux, d’Acremont, and Van der Linden (2008) 
suggested that urgency, a specific pathway of impulsivity, is associated with 
compulsive behaviors in OCD, and others have suggested that this this may be the 
common personality trait shared by individuals with EDs and OCD (Altman & 
Shankman, 2009).      
Lastly, many of the previous studies linking eating pathology to decision-
making deficits have failed to consistently identify the potential source of these 
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decision-making deficits. Potential sources of decision making-deficits in individuals 
with eating disorders include impulsivity, executive functions, skin conductance 
responses, and obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Impulsivity has been examined but 
found not to be significantly correlated to decision-making performance in women with 
BN (Brand et al., 2007) and obese clinical groups (Brogan et al., 2011) or AN, BN, and 
control groups combined (Liao et al., 2009). However, these studies assessed 
impulsivity as a unitary construct (e.g. Impulsiveness subscale score of the Neuroticism 
scale of the NEO Personality Inventory-Revised and total scores on Barratt Impulsivity 
Scale and Consideration of Future Consequences Scale), and did not look at the 
relationship between different impulsivity traits (e.g., negative urgency, etc.) and 
decision making in the groups with eating disorders. Further, Liao et al. (2009) did not 
examine the relationships between impulsivity and decision-making performance 
separately for each individual group. One study found a correlation between executive 
function and decision-making performance in a BN group (Brand et al., 2007). Another 
found reduced overall executive function and reduced cognitive flexibility specifically 
in a BED group compared to controls (Svaldi et al., 2010). Two studies have found a 
correlation between reduced skin conductance response (SCR) and poor decision-
making performance on the IGT in groups with AN (Liao et al., 2009; Tchanturia et al., 
2007), but not in BN (Liao et al., 2009). Finally, obsessive-compulsive symptoms, 
including hoarding symptoms specifically (Lawrence et al., 2006), have been found to 
be significantly negatively correlated with IGT performance in some studies (Liao et 
al., 2009). Some suggest that it is possible that these obsessive-compulsive symptoms, 
which are common in individuals with eating disorders, may be behind the poor IGT 
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performance of the groups with AN (Cavedini et al., 2006) and BN (Laio et al., 2009). 
This study (Liao et al., 2009) is limited, however, in that it did not examine the 
relationship between scores on the OCI and IGT performance looking at each 
individual group (AN, BN, and controls); instead, a correlation was run using all three 
groups combined.    
One study that very eloquently documented the need to understand the potential 
age-related sources of decision-making deficits was reported by Henninger, Madden 
and Huettel (2010). These authors found that older adults made significantly lower-
quality decisions on the BART and the Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT; Rogers et al., 
1999) compared to younger adults, demonstrating higher levels of risk-aversion and 
selection of lower-probability options, respectively (Henninger et al., 2010). In this 
study, it was found that age-related cognitive decline in processing speed and working 
memory mediated age group differences in decision quality. When cognitive factors 
were removed, there were no significant age differences in decision making, suggesting 
that age-related cognitive decline in processing speed in particular may manifest itself 
as impaired decision making in older adults. Suggestions are made that differences in 
presentation of information may diminish these differences in decision making in older 
adults (Henninger et al., 2010). The work of Henninger et al. (2010) provides an 
important model for identifying potential sources of eating disorder related deficits in 
decision making. 
The study of decision making in individuals with eating disorders and the 
factors that may contribute to these decision-making impairments is a valuable area of 
research as it may have important clinical implications for informing treatment. 
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Previous research has found differences in treatment outcome as a function of decision-
making as reflected by performance on the IGT in other clinical populations including 
individuals with OCD (Cavedini et al., 2002). Similarly, it may be beneficial to study 
those factors that are thought to impact or contribute to decision making in individuals 
with eating disorders (e.g., executive function, impulsivity-related personality traits, 
and obsessive-compulsive symptoms) as they may be related to treatment response.    
The Current Study 
Through the use of a broad-based decision-making test battery, the proposed 
study will comprehensively assess decision making in order to thoroughly examine 
performance differences in groups with BN and BED compared to each other and to 
controls using a sample of primarily female college students. In particular, decision 
making under risk will be investigated in a situation where contingencies are not 
explicit (e.g., IGT) as well as in a situation where contingencies are made explicit (e.g., 
GDT). Further, decision making will be examined in situations where the task is 
administered via computer (e.g. IGT, GDT, and BART) and where the task is 
administered via pencil-and-paper (e.g., A-DMC subtests including Resistance to 
Framing, Consistency in Risk Perception, and Applying Decision Rules). Additionally, 
decision making will be assessed in a situation where higher-quality decision making is 
associated with lower risk-taking (e.g., IGT and GDT) and where higher-quality 
decision making is related to higher risk-taking (e.g. BART).  
It is hypothesized that the BN and BED groups will perform more poorly than 
the control group on the computerized decision-making tasks in which higher-quality 
decision making is associated with lower risk (e.g., IGT, GDT). Further, it is 
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hypothesized that the BN and BED groups may even perform better than the control 
group on the computerized decision-making task in which higher-quality decision 
making is associated with higher risk (e.g., the BART). Exploratory comparisons will 
also be performed to examine possible decision-making differences between the BN 
and BED groups and possible differences in decision-making on the pencil-and-paper 
decision-making tasks (i.e., the ADMC subtests) compared to the computerized 
decision-making tasks (i.e. IGT, GDT, and BART) among the groups. Further, analyses 
will be run to explore whether these difference may be explained by differences in 
measures of executive function, impulsivity-related personality traits, or obsessive-
compulsive symptoms.    
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Participants 
The sample consisted of all female participants (N=111): 83 control participants 
(CG), 21 participants with a diagnosis of bulimia nervosa (BN) either currently (n=20) 
or in the past (n=1), and 7 participants with a current diagnosis of binge-eating disorder 
(BED). Participants were primarily recruited from a subject pool of undergraduate 
psychology students at the University of North Dakota campus (n=108) although some 
participants were recruited from the community through advertisements throughout the 
university and at local mental health clinics (n=3). A priori power analysis with a 
desired power of .80 and an effect size of .4 with three groups indicated that a total 
sample size of 66 was needed for this study. In addition, a sample size was chosen that 
was consistent with previous work in this area, which has typically utilized groups of 
between 15 and 29 participants.   
Procedures 
 During the initial phase of the study, a large group of potential participants 
(N=1069) was screened on the Eating Disorder Diagnostic Scale (EDDS) and asked to 
complete the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R), UPPS-P Impulsive 
Behavior Scale, Executive Function Index (EFI), Rutgers Alcohol Problem Index 
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(RAPI), Rutgers Alcohol Problem Index-Drug version (RAPI-D), and a series of 
demographic questions electronically via Qualtrics. Based on performance on the 
EDDS, participants were contacted and invited back to participate in the second phase 
of the study. Specifically, participants with a current or past diagnosis of bulimia 
nervosa in the absence of meeting any exclusionary criteria were included in the BN 
group, and participants with a current or past diagnosis of binge-eating disorder in the 
absence of meeting any exclusionary criteria were include in the BED group. 
Participants without a current or past diagnosis of an eating disorder and who did not 
meet any of the exclusionary criteria were included in the control group. Exclusionary 
criteria for all three groups included severe psychiatric disturbance, a history of 
entering treatment for substance-related disorder, head trauma or neurological disease 
or disorder, learning disability or ADHD, as these factors are thought or have been 
found to be related to decision making.  
During the second phase of the study, participants were administered the WAIS-
IV Vocabulary Subtest followed by the pencil-and-paper decision-making tasks (e.g., 
Adult Decision-Making Competence (A-DMC) index subtests including Applying 
Decision Rules, Consistency in Risk Perception, and Resistance to Framing), the three 
computerized decision-making tasks (i.e., IGT, GDT, and BART), and the BDI-II and 
the BAI, all which were administered by trained researchers after informed consent had 
been obtained. The cognitive measures were given in an alternating fashion such that 
participants with an identification number that was odd were given the measures in this 
order (i.e., WAIS-IV Vocabulary Subtest, A-DMC subtests, IGT, GDT, and BART 
followed by the BDI-II and BAI) and participants with an identification number that 
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was even were given these measures in the opposite order (i.e., BART, GDT, IGT, A-
DMC subtests, and WAIS-IV Vocabulary Subtest, followed by the BDI-II and BAI) to 
guard against fatigue effects. Upon completion of all tasks, participants were debriefed 
and given information about how to follow-up on the results of the research.   
Measures 
Eating Disorder Diagnostic Scale (EDDS): The EDDS is a 22-item self-report 
measure designed to identify individuals with anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, and 
binge-eating disorder diagnoses per the DSM-IV (Stice, Telch, & Rizvi, 2000), 
although this measure was computer-scored in such a way as to reflect the recent DSM-
5 revisions in eating disorder diagnostic criteria for the current study. This instrument 
has demonstrated sound psychometric properties in the diagnostic evaluation of all 
three disorders (AN, BN, and BED). Overall, it has demonstrated good internal 
consistency across items (symptom composite α= .89) and satisfactory test-retest 
reliability (r=.87) as well as criterion validity (with diagnoses generated by structured 
diagnostic interview; mean κ= .83). Further, the original validation study found 
evidence that is suggestive of the measure’s content validity (e.g., panel of experts’ 
refinement of items and agreement that EDDS items address relevant DSM criteria) and 
convergent validity (e.g., significant positive correlations between the EDDS and other 
established and validated measures of eating pathology) in a heterogeneous sample of 
adult females (Stice et al., 2000). Because it is brief and able to be given by untrained 
persons, the EDDS is useful in situations where a full-length diagnostic interview by a 
trained professional is not feasible (Anderson, De Young, & Walker, 2009), making it 
ideal for use in the current study.  
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Iowa Gambling Task (IGT): The IGT is a computerized task that assesses 
risky decision making in a situation where contingencies are not explicit (Bechara et 
al., 1994). Participants start the task with a $2,000 USD loan of play money, and there 
are 100 trials in which the participant selects a card from four different decks. Each 
deck produces different distributions of monetary gains and losses. Two decks (decks A 
and B) are considered disadvantageous because, while they have high expected gains 
(+$100 per trial), they have infrequent but high losses that give them an overall 
negative expected value. The remaining two decks (C and D) are considered 
advantageous as they have lower gains per trial (+50) but low losses that give them an 
overall positive expected value. Thus, for this particular task, higher-quality decision 
making is associated with lower-risk decisions (Henninger et al., 2010). Decision 
making is generally examined in two different ways for the IGT: evaluation of the 
overall net score (i.e., total number of advantageous choices (from decks C and D) 
minus total number of disadvantageous choices (from decks A and B)) and evaluation 
of the net score as the task progresses, which can be done by dividing the 100 trials into 
5 blocks of 20 trials each and comparing the net scores of each block (Danner et al., 
2011). Although the measure was created to assess decision making in patients with 
orbitofrontal cortex damage, the measure has been used to assess decision making in a 
number of other clinical populations including women with eating disorders, and the 
bulk of evidence suggests the construct validity of the measure in detecting decision 
making deficits in clinical populations when used in the context of a comprehensive 
evaluation (Buelow & Suhr, 2009). The extent to which this measure is applicable to 
test-retest situations is not known, and some studies have found a learning effect such 
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that participants perform better with multiple test administrations (Buelow & Suhr, 
2009); however, the IGT will not be used for test-retest purposes in the current study.       
Game of Dice Task (GDT): The GDT is a computerized task that assesses 
risky decision making in a situation where contingencies are made explicit (Brand et 
al., 2005). Participants begin the task with 1,000 € (Euro) and are instructed to 
maximize their capital with 18 throws of a die. For each trial, the participant is 
instructed to guess which number/combination of numbers presented on the screen 
contains the number that will be thrown in the coming up trial. If the number that is 
thrown in a trial matches the single number that is chosen or if it is present in the 
number combination that has been chosen, the participant receives a monetary gain. 
Conversely, if the number does not match or is not contained in the selected number 
combination, the participant incurs a monetary loss (Brand et al., 2005; Brand et al., 
2007).  
There are four “levels” of alternatives in the GDT, and each level contains 
different amounts of numbers. Alternatives contain a single number or a combination of 
two, three, and four numbers (Brand et al., 2007) that is associated with a different 
gain/loss amount that remains fixed and visible to the participant on the screen 
throughout the entire task (i.e., a single number option is associated with 1000 € 
gain/loss; combinations containing two numbers are associated with 500 € gain/loss; 
combinations containing three numbers are associated with 200 € gain/loss; 
combinations containing four numbers are associated with 100 € gain/loss). The 
gain/loss associated with the alternative is related to its probability of occurrence (e.g., 
those numbers/combinations of numbers having a lower probability of being rolled are 
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associated with higher gain, but higher loss), and the amount of risk can be reasoned by 
the participant for each option (e.g., for single number options, it can be easily reasoned 
that there is a 1:6 chance of winning 1000 € but a 5:6 chance of losing that same 
amount of money) (Brand et al., 2005; Brand et al., 2007) .  
Single numbers and combinations of two numbers are considered 
disadvantageous or “risky” as they are associated with frequent high losses and 
infrequent high gains (<50% probability of winning money). Combinations of three or 
four numbers are considered advantageous or “non-risky” in that they are associated 
with a higher probability of gain (>50% probability of winning money) over the long 
run (Brand et al., 2005; Brand et al., 2007). Decision making is generally examined in a 
few different ways for the GDT including evaluation of the overall net score (i.e., total 
number of “non-risky” or safe choices minus total number of “risky” choices) and 
evaluation of the ending balance (e.g., the balance with which the participant ends the 
task). 
GDT performance has been found to be correlated with other measures of 
executive function and feedback processing (see Brand, Labudda, & Markowitsch, 
2006), which is suggestive of the construct validity of the measure. Further, the GDT 
has detected decision-making performance differences in a number of clinical 
populations (e.g., pathological gambling, Parkinson’s disease, Korsakoff’s syndrome, 
and OCD) compared to controls including women with eating disorders (see Brand et 
al., 2007).  
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART): The BART is a computerized task used 
to measure decision-making quality (Lejuez et al., 2002). In this task, participants are 
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presented with a series of 10 virtual balloons that they are instructed to inflate using 
key presses. The participant accumulates a small amount of money for each key press 
(1 cent/key press) that they make on an un-popped balloon. The money accumulated for 
a particular balloon is lost if the participant pops the balloon by inflating it too much, 
but the risk of popping the balloon and subsequently losing the accumulated money is 
small. Decision making on this task is typically defined by the average number of key 
presses on un-popped balloons. Because participants tend to pump too-few times 
compared to what is considered ideal (e.g., 64 pumps; Lejuez et al., 2002), higher 
values on this measure are indicative of better decision making and lower values reflect 
poorer decision making. This is unlike the IGT where higher-quality decision making is 
associated with lower-risk decisions (Henninger et al., 2010). The test has demonstrated 
adequate test-retest reliability (r=.77, p<.001; White, Lejuez, & de Wit, 2008), and 
significant correlations between the BART Adjusted Average Pump Count score and 
measures of risk-related constructs and self-reported risk behavior is suggestive of the 
construct validity of this measure (Lejuez et al., 2002).     
Adult Decision-Making Competence (A-DMC) Index: The A-DMC index, 
which was adapted from the Youth Decision-Making Competence index (Y-DMC; 
Parker & Fischhoff, 2005) is a 103-item, pencil-and-paper instrument that includes 7 
subtests that assess different components of the decision-making process (Bruine de 
Bruin et al., 2007): these different subtests include Resistance to Framing, Recognizing 
Social Norms, Under/Overconfidence, Applying Decision Rules, Consistency in Risk 
Perception, Path Independence, and Resistance to Sunk Costs. Overall, the measure has 
demonstrated good internal consistency reliability (Cronbach’s α= .83 across the seven 
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A-DMC subtests) and test-retest reliability (r= .68, p<.001). Furthermore, evidence has 
been found in support of the construct validity of the measure as reflected by significant 
relationships with related measures of cognitive ability and decision-making style. 
Additionally, the A-DMC overall has demonstrated predictive validity as reflected by 
significant correlations with measures of decision outcomes (Bruine de Bruin et al., 
2007). For the present study, the Resistance to Framing, Applying Decision Rules, and 
Consistency in Risk Perception subtests were used. These subtests were chosen because  
factor analysis using the principal factors method revealed that the Applying Decision 
Rules, Resistance to Framing, and Consistency in Risk Perception subtests have the 
highest factor loadings (r= .46-.79) out of all of the subtests on a one-factor model that 
appears to represent the construct of decision-making ability (Bruine de Bruin et al., 
2007).   
The Resistance to Framing subtest is designed to evaluate whether differences 
in the way a problem is described or presented affect the examinee’s value assessment. 
It has demonstrated adequate internal consistency reliability (Cronbach’s α = .62) and 
test-retest reliability (r= .58, p<.001).This 14-item task is divided into two different 
types of items: risky-choice and attribute framing (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007).  
The 7 risky-choice framing items  present participants with a hypothetical 
scenario in which they must indicate their preference for a “risky-choice” option or a 
“sure-thing” option on a scale from 1 (definitely would choose Option A) to 6 
(definitely would choose Option B). Participants are presented with a gain version and 
a loss version equivalent of the same problem later in the survey, which is considered 1 
“item.” For example, the gain version of one problem states that the lives of 1,200 
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endangered animals are being threatened by pesticide and presents the participant with 
two options: Option A, if used, will result in 600 animals being saved for sure, and 
Option B, if used, has a 75% chance that 800 animals will be saved and 25% chance 
that no animals will be saved. Participants are instructed to indicate their preference 
between the two options on a 6-point scale with 1 indicating the participant would 
definitely choose Option A and 6 indicating that the participant would definitely choose 
Option B. The corresponding loss version presents the same hypothetical scenario but 
frames the options as a loss (i.e. Option A, if used, will result in 600 animals being lost 
for sure, and Option B, if used, has a 75% chance that 400 animals will be lost and 25% 
chance that 1,200 animals will be lost). The other risky-choice framing items present 
hypothetical scenarios that involve income tax, dropping out of school, unusual disease 
outbreak, cancer treatment, and stock market investment strategies, and instruct 
examinees to indicate a preference between a risky option and a sure thing option 
(Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007).  
In the 7 attribute framing items, participants are asked to rate their judgment of 
a hypothetical product or situation on a 6-point scale. Participants are presented with a 
positively framed version of the problem and negatively framed equivalent of the same 
problem later in the survey, which is considered 1 “item.” For example, the positively 
framed version of one problem states that 35% of graduating seniors who completed a 
survey reported that they did not cheat during their college career. Participants are 
instructed to rate the incidence of cheating at their university from 1 (very low) to 6 
(very high). The negatively framed equivalent of this problem states that 65% of 
graduating seniors who completed a survey reported that they did in fact cheat during 
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their college career and instructs participants to rate incidence of cheating. The other 
attribute framing items present products or situations that involve condom 
effectiveness, meat quality, project funding, performance evaluation, fining, and cancer 
treatment (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). 
The 10-item Applying Decision Rules subtest is designed to assess ability to 
effectively apply different sets of rules to make decisions. For each item, participants 
are presented with a hypothetical consumer who wishes to purchase a DVD player but 
has preferences that differ in terms of 4 different DVD features: picture quality, sound 
quality, programming options, and reliability of brand. Participants are instructed to 
choose from 5 different DVD players labeled A, B, C, D, and E, each which vary in 
how they are rated from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high) on these four different features 
but are the same in terms of price to meet the preferences of the hypothetical consumer. 
This subtest has demonstrated adequate internal consistency reliability (Cronbach’s α 
=.73) and test-retest reliability (r=.77, p<.001) (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007).  
The 20-item Consistency in Risk Perception subtest is designed to measure 
one’s ability to follow probability rules (Bruine de Bruin, Parker et al., 2007). In this 
task, participants are instructed to guess the probability of a specific event happening to 
them at two different points of time in the future (e. g. within the next year and within 
the next 5 years) on a scale from 0%, which indicates no chance, and 100%, which 
indicates certainty. This task includes time-frame pairs (e.g., what is the probability of 
an event happening within the next year, and what is the probability of an event 
happening within the next 5 years), subset-superset pairs (i.e., probability that you will 
die from any cause is a superset of the subset of dying in a terrorist attack), and 
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complementary pairs (i.e., probability of getting into a car accident and probability of 
not getting into an accident). Items include such events as visiting the dentist, having a 
cavity filled, dying from any cause, dying in a terrorist attack, having something stolen, 
having someone break into one’s home and steal something, etc. This subtest has 
demonstrated adequate internal consistency reliability (Cronbach’s α = .72) and test-
retest reliability (r= .72, p<.001) (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007).  
The Executive Function Index (EFI): The EFI is a brief, self-report measure 
that assesses executive function (Spinella, 2005). This instrument consists of 27 items 
and 5 subscales that are attributed to executive functions and were derived through item 
analysis and factors analysis: Motivational Drive, Strategic Planning, Organization, 
Impulsive Control, and Empathy. The Motivational Drive subscale assesses behavioral 
drive, activity level, and interest in novelty. The Strategic Planning subscale measures 
strategic planning as reflected in tendencies to think ahead, plan, and use strategies. The 
Organization subscale measures the ability to carry out organized, goal-directed 
behavior as reflected by multitasking, sequencing, and holding information in one’s 
mind to make decisions. The Impulse Control subscale assesses the ability to control 
one’s impulses as reflected by self-inhibition, risk taking, and social conduct. The 
Empathy subscale assesses empathy as reflected by a concern for the well-being of 
others, prosocial behaviors, and cooperative attitude. Higher scores on all of these 
subscales are indicative of better executive functioning. The scores from all 5 subscales 
are summed to produce a total score that is an overall index of executive function. The 
internal consistency of the individual scales (Cronbach’s α ranging from .69-.76) as 
well as the total score (Cronbach’s α= .82) is good. Additionally, the measure correlates 
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strongly with other validated self-report measure of executive functioning which is 
supportive of the construct validity of this measure (Spinella, 2005).   
The (negative) Urgency, (lack of) Premeditation, (lack of) Perseverance, 
Sensation Seeking, and Positive Urgency (UPPS-P) Impulsive Behavior Scale: The 
UPPS-P Impulsive Behavior Scale is a 59-item self-report measure that assesses five 
personality pathways leading to impulsive behavior (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001; 
Lynam, Smith, Whiteside, & Cyders, 2006). This instrument is a revised version of the 
UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001), which was derived 
through factor analysis of the Five-Factor Model (FFM) of personality (Costa & 
McCrae, 1992) and nine widely-used impulsivity measures in a large college sample, 
and is divided into four subscales, each representing a different distinct impulsivity-
related personality traits: negative urgency, lack of premeditation, lack of perseverance, 
and sensation seeking (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001).  The UPPS-P incorporates a scale 
developed by Cyders et al. (2007) that assesses another distinct impulsivity-related 
personality trait: positive urgency (Lyman et al., 2006). 
The (negative) Urgency subscale assesses an individual’s tendency to engage in 
impulsive actions in response to negative emotions, possibly in an attempt to lessen 
those unpleasant emotions (Whiteside, Lynam, Miller, & Reynolds, 2005). For 
example, one of the items included in this subscale asks the participant to respond to 
the statement “When I’m upset I often act without thinking” on a 5-point Likert-type 
scale ranging from “not true of me” to “very true of me” (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001). 
One study found this subscale to be most strongly related to eating problems compared 
to the other three subscales of the UPPS (Miller, Flory, Lynam, & Leukefeld, 2003). 
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Other studies have found this subscale to be predictive of bulimic symptomology in 
particular in college and clinical samples, even when controlling for other relevant 
covariates (i.e., depression, anxiety symptoms, the other three UPPS subscales, etc.) 
(Anestis, Selby, & Joiner, 2007; Anestis, Smith, Fink, & Joiner, 2009). Further, a meta-
analysis of 50 studies in this area of research found negative urgency to have the largest 
effect size with respect to bulimia symptom expression when compared to the other 
three subscales of the UPPS (Fischer, Smith, & Cyders, 2008). The Lack of 
Premeditation subscale assesses difficulty in thinking through the consequences of 
one’s actions prior to engaging in them. The Lack of Perseverance subscale measures 
an individual’s tendency to experience difficulty in sustaining focus on a task that is 
boring or difficult. The Sensation Seeking subscale assesses a tendency to seek out 
experiences that are exciting and to be open to engaging in new experiences that may 
prove dangerous (Whiteside et al., 2005). The Positive Urgency subscale, which was 
later added to the UPPS, assesses an individual’s tendency to engage in impulsive 
actions in the presence of positive emotions (Lynam et al., 2006; Cyders et al., 2007).      
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R): The OCI-R, which is a 
shortened version of the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (OCI; Foa et al., 1998), is an 
18-item self-report measure designed to assess distress related to obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms (Foa et al., 2002). The instrument consists of 6 subscales reflecting the most 
common types of obsessive-compulsive symptom categories: Checking, Washing, 
Obsessing, Mental Neutralizing, Ordering, and Hoarding. The subscales are DSM-IV 
theoretically driven and derived through factor analysis. This instrument was designed 
and validated for use in clinical and nonclinical populations (Foa et al., 2002). It has 
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demonstrated good to excellent internal consistency reliability (total sample; α= .90 
(total score); α ranging from .83-.90 (subscales)) and test-retest reliability (rs= .57-.91) 
and has generated evidence that is suggestive of the convergent validity of the measure 
(e.g., the measure correlated highly with the original OCI (total scores rs= .98; subscale 
scores rs>.90 except the Mental Neutralizing scale in which rs= .74) (Foa et al., 2002). 
These psychometric qualities were largely retained in a large a non-clinical college 
sample (Hajcak, Huppert, Simons, & Foa, 2004).   
Beck Depression Inventory, Second Edition (BDI-II):  The BDI-II is a 
widely-used, psychometrically-sound 21-item self-report instrument aimed at 
measuring depression symptoms (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The individual’s score 
is interpreted by comparing their raw score to cutoff scores that may be indicative of 
different levels of depression (Beck et al., 1996).  
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI):  The BAI is a widely-used, psychometrically-
sound 21-item self-report instrument that assesses severity of anxiety symptoms (Beck, 
Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988). The individual’s score is interpreted by comparing 
their raw score to cutoff scores that may be indicative of different levels of anxiety 
(Beck et al., 1988). 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, fourth edition (WAIS-IV), Vocabulary 
Subtest: The WAIS-IV Vocabulary subtest is a 30-item measure of verbal ability 
(Sattler & Ryan, 2009). For this subtest, participants are asked to provide definitions for 
different words that become increasingly more difficult to define as the subtest 
progresses. This subtest provides a good estimate of general cognitive ability. Factor 
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analysis has revealed that the Vocabulary subtest has the highest loading on “g” out of 
all the WAIS subtests (Sattler & Ryan, 2009).   
Rutgers Alcohol Problem Index (RAPI): The 18-item RAPI is a brief, self-
report measure used to screen for problem drinking in adolescents and young adults 
(White & Labouvie, 1989, 2000). This instrument has demonstrated both sound 
reliability and appears to demonstrate construct validity in clinical as well as 
nonclinical samples of adolescents and young adults (White & Labouvie, 1989, 2000; 
White et al., 1988). Additionally, the 18-item version correlates very highly (r= .99) 
with the original 23-item version (White & Labouvie, 2000). Thus, the short, 18-item 
version was used in this study. For the purposes of this study, participants were asked 
to answer items related to problem drinking during the past year.   
Rutgers Alcohol Problem Index- Drug (RAPI-D): The RAPI has 
demonstrated sound reliability and appears to demonstrate construct validity in clinical 
as well as nonclinical samples of adolescents and young adults (White & Labouvie, 
1989, 2000; White et al., 1988). This measure has been modified to assess for problem 
drug-use as well. The RAPI-D is a brief, 26-item self-report measure used to screen for 
problem drug-use in adolescents and young adults (Johnson & White, 1995). For the 
purposes of this study, participants were asked to answer items related to problem drug-
use including the use of marijuana and all other illegal drugs during the past year.   
Statistical Analyses 
 Initial data inspection revealed that several of the variables violated the 
assumption of normality. Thus, data transformation procedures were conducted on a 
number of variables that demonstrated significant skewness and/or kurtosis to approach 
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normality. A square root transformation was used for those variables demonstrating 
moderate positive skew including the BART adjusted average pump count, A-DMC 
Resistance to Framing subtest, UPPS-P Lack of Perseverance scale, UPPS-P Positive 
Urgency scale, all OCI-R scores (Washing, Obsessing, Hoarding, Ordering, Checking, 
Mental Neutralizing, and OCI-R total score), the BDI-II and the BAI. Variables that 
demonstrated a moderate negative skew (e.g., GDT ending overall net score and ending 
balance and EFI Empathy scale) were reflected followed by a square root 
transformation; thus, interpretation of these variables must also be reversed. Finally, 
arcsine data transformation was applied to the A-DMC Consistency in Risk Perception 
subtest as the variable was reflected as a proportion.  
Data analysis was conducted using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
(SPSS), version 20.0. A series of between-groups, one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVAs) was run to compare groups (i.e., BN, BED, and CG) on the demographic 
variables (e.g., age, education level), body mass index (BMI), estimated cognitive 
ability, depression symptoms, and anxiety symptoms. Further, between-groups, one-
way ANOVAs were run to compare the groups on decision-making performance on the 
different tasks. Games-Howell post-hoc testing was conducted to follow-up significant 
F-values generated by ANOVA. This post-hoc test was chosen because unequal 
variances and/or unequal cell sizes were observed for all variables. Additionally, in 
order to make comparisons with current research, a 3 (Group) x 5 (Block) mixed-design 
ANOVA was run to examine group differences in performance, or strategies, on the 
IGT as the task progressed. Pearson bivariate correlation analysis was run to examine 
the relationship between UPPS-P, EFI, and OCI-R scores and performance on the 
44 
 
decision-making tasks. Finally, Pearson bivariate correlation analysis was run to 
examine the relationship between eating disorder symptom severity as specified in the 
DSM-5 (i.e., frequency of inappropriate compensatory behaviors in BN and frequency 
of binge-eating episodes in BED) and decision-making performance in the group with 
BN and group with BED. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Demographic Variables 
The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1 for each group for 
age; education level; Vocabulary subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, 4th 
Edition; Body Mass Index (BMI); Beck Depression Inventory, 2nd Edition (BDI-II); 
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI); Rutgers Alcohol Problem Index (RAPI); and Rutgers 
Alcohol Problem Index- Drug version (RAPI-D) scores. A series of one-way ANOVA 
was run to compare the groups on these variables. No significant differences were 
found between the groups for age, education, or Vocabulary subtest raw score. A 
significant difference between the groups was observed for the BDI-II, F(2,107)=12.72, 
p<.001. Subsequent Games-Howell post-hoc testing revealed that the BN group scored 
significantly higher than both the CG (p<.001) and the BED group (p=.010), but there 
was no significant difference between the CG and BED group on the BDI-II. Further, 
there were significant between-group differences on the BAI, F(2,108)=5.69, p=.004. 
Subsequent Games-Howell post-hoc testing revealed that the BN group scored 
significantly higher than the CG (p=.012) and the BED group (p=.006) but there was no 
significant difference between the BED and CG on the BAI. While the one-way 
ANOVA revealed significant between-group differences on BMI, F(2,108)=6.06, 
p=.003), there were no significant group differences identified Games-Howell post-hoc 
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analysis. Finally, there were no significant between group differences on RAPI or 
RAPI-D scores. 
Table 1 
Group Differences on Demographic Variables  
  
CG 
 
BN 
 
BED 
 
F 
 
p 
 
Age n=82 n=21 n=7   
M 20.13 21.05 19.71 .474 .624 
SD (4.21) (4.47) (1.38)   
 
Education n=83 n=21 n=6   
M 13.77 13.90 13.66 .095 .909 
SD (1.24) (1.92) (1.63)   
 
Vocabulary Raw 
Score 
n=83 n=21 n=7   
M 34.59 36.61 36.14 .797 .453 
SD (7.02) (6.97) (6.34)   
 
BMI n=83 n=21 n=7   
M 23.27 26.25 28.39 6.057 .003 
SD (4.28) (6.37) (5.95)   
 
BDI-II  n=82 n=21 n=7   
M 8.02 17.43 8.00 12.715 <.001 
SD (5.84) (9.93) (3.92)   
 
BAI n=83 n=21 n=7   
M 8.33 14.71 6.29 5.694 .004 
SD (7.66) (11.07) (1.98)   
 
RAPI  n=69 n=17 n=4   
M 3.93 4.47 3.25 .113 .893 
SD (5.45) (5.06) (2.22)   
 
RAPI-D n=22 n=9 n=1   
M 4.91 3.89 .000 .268* .791 
SD (10.69) (5.99)    
Note. M= Mean. SD= Standard Deviation. CG= Control Group. BN= Bulimia Nervosa. BED= Binge-
Eating Disorder. Age is reported in years. Education is reported in total years completed. Vocabulary 
Raw Score= WAIS-IV Vocabulary Subtest Raw Score. BMI= Body Mass Index. BDI-II= Beck 
Depression Inventory, 2
nd
 Edition, Raw Score. BAI= Beck Anxiety Inventory Raw Score. RAPI= 
Rutgers Alcohol Problem Index. RAPI-D= Rutgers Alcohol Problem Index- Drug Version. *An 
independent samples t-test was run to compare the CG and the BN group on the RAPI-D (as the BED 
group n=1). 
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Executive Function Index (EFI) Scores  
The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 2 for the EFI 
composite score and for the Motivational Drive, Organization, Strategic Planning, 
Impulse Control, and Empathy scale scores for the different groups (e.g., CG, BN, and 
BED). A series of one-way ANOVA was run to compare the groups on these variables. 
There were significant between-group differences on the EFI composite score, 
F(2,105)=8.66, p<.001, with the Games-Howell post-hoc test revealing that the BN 
group scored significantly lower than the CG (p<.001) while there were no significant 
differences between either the BN and BED groups or the CG and the BED group 
despite that fact that the BED group had a mean score that was identical to the BN 
group. This may be a result of using the Games-Howell post-hoc test, which is a very 
conservative post-hoc analysis used when the homogeneity of variance assumption has 
been violated and/or unequal cell sizes are observed. Further, there were significant 
between-group differences on the Organization scale, F(2,107)=8.89, p<.001, with the 
Games-Howell post-hoc test revealing that the BN group scored significantly lower 
than the CG (p<.001) while there were no significant differences between either the BN 
and the BED groups or the CG and the BED group. This scale assesses ability to carry 
out organized, goal-directed behavior, with higher scores indicating higher levels of 
organization and lower levels indicating lower levels of this construct. There were also 
significant between-group differences on the Impulse Control scale, F(2,108)=5.58, 
p=.005, with the Games-Howell post-hoc analysis revealing that the BN group scored 
significantly lower than the CG (p=.001) while there were no significant differences 
between either the BN and the BED groups or the CG and the BED group. This scale 
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assesses the ability to control one’s impulses as reflected by self-inhibition, for 
example, with higher scores indicating higher levels of impulse control and lower 
scores indicating lower levels. Finally, there were no significant between group 
differences on the Motivational Drive, Strategic Planning, or Empathy scales. The 
Motivational Drive scale assesses behavioral drive, activity level, and interest in 
novelty, and the Strategic Planning Scale reflects tendencies to think ahead, plan, and 
use strategies. The Empathy scale assesses empathy and concern for the well-being of 
others. On all of the EFI scales, higher scores are indicative of better executive 
functioning. 
Table 2 
Group Differences on Executive Function Index (EFI) Composite and Scale Scores  
  
CG 
 
 
BN 
 
 
BED 
 
 
F 
 
p 
 
EFI Composite Score n=80 n=21 n=7   
M 102.70 94.43 94.43 8.655 <.001 
SD (9.74) (6.20) (7.63)   
 
Motivational Drive Scale  n=83 n=21 n=7   
M 14.55 13.57 14.14 1.141 .323 
SD (2.67) (2.84) (2.41)   
 
Organization Scale n=82 n=21 n=7   
M 18.33 15.19 15.86 8.886 <.001 
SD (2.95) (3.83) (4.60)   
 
Strategic Planning Scale n=82 n=21 n=7   
M 25.95 24.19 24.71 2.596 .079 
SD (3.39) (3.39) (1.50)   
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Table 2 (continued) 
  
CG 
 
 
BN 
 
 
BED 
 
 
F 
 
p 
 
Impulse Control Scale n=83 n=21 n=7   
M 17.42 14.71 16.29 5.584 .005 
SD (3.28) (3.85) (2.29)   
 
Empathy Scale n=82 n=21 n=7   
M 25.96 26.76 23.43 2.432 .093 
SD (3.08) (2.51) (4.04)   
Note. M= Mean. SD= Standard Deviation. CG= Control Group. BN= Bulimia Nervosa. 
BED= Binge-Eating Disorder. EFI= Executive Function Index.   
 
UPPS-P Impulsive Behavior Scale Scores  
 
The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 3 for the UPPS-P 
Negative Urgency, Lack of Premeditation, Lack of Perseverance, Sensation Seeking 
and Positive Urgency scale scores for the different groups (e.g., CG, BN, and BED). A 
series of one-way ANOVAs was run to compare the groups on these variables. There 
were significant between-group differences on the Negative Urgency scale, 
F(2,104)=21.47, p<.001, with Games-Howell post-hoc testing revealing that the BN 
group scored significantly higher than the CG (p<.001) while there were no significant 
differences between either the BN and the BED groups or the CG and the BED group. 
This scale assesses negative urgency, with higher scores reflecting more of a tendency 
to behave impulsively in response to negative emotions and lower scores reflecting less 
of a tendency to behave this way. Further, there were significant between-group 
differences on the Lack of Perseverance scale, F(2,103)=4.55, p=.013, with Games-
Howell post-hoc testing revealing that the BN group scored significantly higher than 
the CG (p=.013) while there were no significant differences between either the BN and 
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the BED groups or the CG and the BED group. This scale assesses lack of 
perseverance, with higher scores reflecting more of a tendency to experience difficulty 
in sustaining focus on a task that is boring or difficult and lower scores reflecting less 
of a tendency to experience difficulty sustaining focus on these tasks. There were also 
significant between-group differences on the Positive Urgency scale, F(2,106)=12.22, 
p<.001, with Games-Howell post-hoc testing revealing that the BN group scored 
significantly higher than the CG (p<.001) while there were no significant differences 
between either the BN and the BED groups or the CG and the BED group. This scale 
assesses positive urgency, with higher scores reflecting more of a tendency to behave 
impulsively in response to positive emotions and lower scores reflecting less of a 
tendency to behave this way. While there were significant between-group differences 
on the Lack of Premeditation scale, F(2,105)=3.53, p=.033, there were no significant 
group differences identified with Games-Howell post-hoc testing. This scale measures 
lack of premeditation, with higher scores reflecting more difficulty in thinking through 
the consequences of one’s actions prior to engaging in them and lower scores reflecting 
less difficulty in doing so. Finally, there were no significant between group differences 
on the Sensation Seeking scale. This scale assesses sensation seeking, with higher 
scores reflecting a tendency to seek out novel and exciting experiences and willingness 
to engage in new experiences that may prove dangerous and lower scores reflecting less 
of a tendency to engage in this behavior. 
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Table 3 
Group Differences on UPPS-P Impulsive Behavior Scale Scores 
 CG BN 
 
BED 
 
F P 
 
Negative Urgency Scale n=79 n=21 n=7   
M 23.96 33.81 28.43 21.469 <.001 
SD (6.16) (6.32) (6.16)   
 
Lack of Premeditation Scale n=80 n=21 n=7   
M 20.35 23.19 22.57 3.526 .033 
SD (4.51) (5.19) (4.35)   
 
Lack of Perseverance Scale n=79 n=20 n=7   
M 17.18 20.40 18.57 4.547 .013 
SD (4.33) (4.36) (4.61)   
 
Sensation Seeking Scale n=83 n=21 n=7   
M 32.11 34.95 29.86 2.137 .123 
SD (6.80) (5.66) (7.22)   
 
Positive Urgency Scale n=82 n=21 n=6   
M 21.72 30.24 24.83 12.215 <.001 
SD (6.35) (8.04) (10.59)   
Note. M= Mean. SD= Standard Deviation. CG= Control Group. BN= Bulimia Nervosa. 
BED= Binge-Eating Disorder. UPPS-P= The (negative) Urgency, (lack of) 
Premeditation, (lack of) Perseverance, Sensation Seeking, and Positive Urgency 
(UPPS-P) Impulsive Behavior Scale.  
 
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R) Scores  
The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 4 for the OCI-R total 
score and the Washing, Obsessing, Hoarding, Ordering, Checking, and Mental 
Neutralizing scale scores for the different groups (e.g., CG, BN, and BED). A series of 
one-way ANOVA was run to compare the groups on these variables. There were 
significant between-group differences on the OCI-R total score, F(2,106)=6.19, p=.003, 
with Games-Howell post-hoc testing revealing that the BN group scored significantly 
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higher than the CG (p=.006) while there were no significant differences between either 
the BN and the BED groups or the CG and the BED group. This score is derived from 
summing the scores of its six scales (Washing, Obsessing, Hoarding, Ordering, 
Checking, and Mental Neutralizing) which assess the extent to which the examinee is 
experiencing distress as a result of common symptoms seen in individuals with OCD. 
This score provides an overall measure of the presence and severity of obsessive-
compulsive symptoms with higher scores reflecting higher levels of distress caused by 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms and lower scores reflecting lower levels of distress 
caused by obsessive-compulsive symptoms.   
Further, there were significant between-group differences on the Obsessing 
scale, F(2,106)=9.45, p<.001, with Games-Howell post-hoc testing revealing that the 
BN group scored significantly higher than both the CG (p=.001) and BED group 
(p=.027) while there were no significant differences between the CG and the BED 
group. This scale assesses obsessions, with higher scores reflecting higher levels of 
distress caused by obsessive thoughts and lower scores reflecting lower levels of 
distress caused by obsessions. Also, there were significant between-group differences 
on the Mental Neutralizing Scale, F(2,108)=4.958, p=.009, with Games-Howell post-
hoc testing revealing that the BN group scored significantly higher than both the CG 
(p=.029) and the BED group (p=.028) while there were no significant differences 
between the CG and the BED group. This scale assesses mental neutralizing, with 
higher scores reflecting higher levels of distress caused by attempting to mentally 
neutralize, or defuse, obsessions and lower scores reflecting lower levels of distress 
caused by this process. Further, although there were significant between-group 
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differences on the Checking scale, F(2,108)=3.37, p=.038, no between-group 
differences were identified using Games-Howell post-hoc testing. This scale assesses 
checking symptoms, with higher scores reflecting higher levels of distress caused by 
checking behaviors and lower scores reflecting lower levels of distress caused by this 
behavior. Finally, there were no significant between-group differences on the Hoarding, 
Washing, and Ordering scales. These scales assess hoarding, washing, and ordering 
symptoms, respectively, with higher scores reflecting higher levels of distress caused 
by these behaviors and lower scores reflecting lower levels of distress caused by these 
symptoms. 
Table 4 
Group Differences on Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R) Scores 
  
CG 
 
 
BN 
 
 
BED 
 
 
F 
 
p 
 
OCI-R Total Score n=82 n=20 n=7   
M 11.13 19.90 11.57 6.193 .003 
SD (8.07) (11.11) (6.97)   
 
Washing Scale n=83 n=21 n=7   
M 1.12 1.86 1.43 1.549 .217 
SD (1.44) (1.85) (1.13)   
 
Obsessing Scale n=82 n=20 n=7   
M 1.66 4.20 1.14 9.448 <.001 
SD (2.20) (2.97) (1.46)   
 
Hoarding Scale n=82 n=21 n=7   
M 2.37 4.05 3.29 2.956 .056 
SD (1.92) (2.58) (3.15)   
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
  
CG 
 
 
BN 
 
 
BED 
 
 
F 
 
p 
      
Ordering Scale n=83 n=21 n=7   
M 3.18 3.52 2.71 0.218 .805 
SD (2.82) (2.82) (1.98)   
 
Checking Scale n=83 n=21 n=7   
M 1.71 3.33 2.57 5.729 .004 
SD (1.69) (2.71) (2.94)   
 
Mental Neutralizing Scale n=83 n=21 n=7   
M 1.06 2.33 0.43 3.978 .022 
SD (1.88) (2.71) (0.53)   
Note. M= Mean. SD= Standard Deviation. CG= Control Group. BN= Bulimia Nervosa. 
BED= Binge-Eating Disorder. OCI-R= Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised.  
 
Computerized Decision-Making Task (IGT, GDT, and BART) Scores  
The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 5 for the 
computerized decision-making task scores including the IGT overall net score, IGT 
ending balance, GDT overall net score, GDT ending balance, and the BART adjusted 
average pump count scores for the different groups (e.g., CG, BN, and BED). The IGT 
overall net score provides an overall measure of risky decision-making performance 
and is generated by subtracting the total number of disadvantageous deck selections 
(e.g., A and B) from the total number of advantageous deck selections (e.g., C and D), 
with higher scores reflecting better or safer decision-making performance and lower 
scores indicating poorer or riskier decision making. The GDT overall net score 
provides an overall measure of risky decision-making performance in a situation with 
explicit contingencies and is generated by subtracting the total number of risky die 
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selections (i.e., choosing from one or two-number combinations) from the total number 
of safe or “non-risky” die selections (i.e., choosing from three or four-number 
combinations), with higher scores reflecting better or safer decision-making 
performance and lower scores indicating poorer or riskier decision making. The GDT 
ending balance, which is the final balance with which the participant has ended the 
task, provides another overall measure of risky decision-making performance in a 
situation with explicit contingencies. The BART adjusted average pump count is the 
average number of key presses on un-popped balloons and provides an overall measure 
of decision making. Because participants tend to pump too-few times compared to what 
is considered ideal (e.g., 64 pumps; Lejuez et al., 2002), higher values on this measure 
are indicative of better decision making and lower values reflect poorer decision 
making. A series of one-way ANOVA was run to compare the groups on these 
variables. There were no significant between group differences on any of the 
computerized decision-making scores. 
Further, a 3 (Group) x 5 (Block) mixed-design ANOVA was run to examine 
group differences in performance, or strategies, on the IGT as the task progressed using 
group as the between-group factor and block net scores, which are generated by 
subtracting the total “disadvantageous” card selections from the total “advantageous” 
card selections for each successive block of 20 trials, as the within-subjects factor. 
There was a significant main effect for the within-subject factor of block net scores as 
the IGT progressed, F(2, 105)=6.480, p<.001, suggesting that participants experienced 
a learning effect as reflected by mean block net scores that increased as the task 
progressed (e.g., Block 1= -3.62; Block 2= 3.35; Block 3= 3.97; Block 4= 4.58; Block 
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5=4.91). However, both the main effect of group and the interaction between group and 
block net score were not significant, suggesting that there were no significant between-
group differences on IGT performance and that performance on the IGT as the task 
progressed did not differ as a function of group status.  
Table 5 
Group Differences on the IGT, GDT, and BART 
  
CG 
 
BN 
 
 
BED 
 
 
F 
 
p 
 
IGT Overall Net Score n=83 n=21 n=7   
M 10.24 18.48 10.86 .755 .472 
SD (26.78) (30.01) (28.70)   
 
IGT Ending Balance n=83 n=21 n=7   
M -723.92 -308.10 -702.86 .877 .419 
SD (1212.98) (1523.92) (1466.69)   
 
GDT Overall Net Score n=83 n=21 n=7   
M 9.11 8.86 6.86 .246 .783 
SD (9.38) (9.09) (9.51)   
 
GDT Ending Balance n=83 n=21 n=7   
M 225.30 -123.81 -1428.57 1.514 .225 
SD (2812.71) (2589.96) (2082.24)   
 
BART Adjusted Average Pump Count n=83 n=21 n=7   
M 22.57 25.30 26.77 .653 .523 
SD (11.61) (14.13) (10.20)   
Note. M= Mean. SD= Standard Deviation. CG= Control Group. BN= Bulimia Nervosa. BED= Binge 
Eating Disorder. IGT= Iowa Gambling Task. GDT= Game of Dice Task. BART= Balloon Analogue 
Risk Task.  
 
Pencil-and-Paper Decision-Making Task (ADMC Resistance to Framing, 
Consistency in Risk Perception, and Applying Decision Rules) Scores 
 
The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 6 for the scores from 
the paper-and-pencil administered Adult Decision-Making Competence (A-DMC) 
index’s Resistance to Framing, Consistency in Risk Perception, and Applying Decision 
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Rules subtests for the different groups (e.g., CG, BN, and BED). A series of one-way 
ANOVA was run to compare the groups on these variables. There were significant 
between-group differences on the Resistance to Framing subtest, F(2,111)=6.51, 
p=.002, with Games-Howell post-hoc testing revealing that the BN group scored 
significantly lower than the CG (p=.021) while there were no significant differences 
between the CG and the BED group and the BED and the BN groups despite the fact 
that the BED group had a mean that was even lower than the mean of the BN group. 
This, again, may be a result of using the very conservative Games-Howell post-hoc test 
which takes into account heterogeneity of variance and unequal group sizes. 
Performance on this particular task is evaluated by the extent to which the examinee is 
able to resist being influenced by the way the question is framed in their assessment of 
the value of that question. It should be noted that a lower score on this particular subtest 
is indicative of better decision making. Finally, there were no significant between-
group differences on the Consistency in Risk Perception or the Applying Decision 
Rules subtests. These tasks assess the extent to which the examinee is able to follow 
probability rules and apply different sets of rules in making decisions, respectively. On 
both of these tests, higher scores reflect better decision making. 
Pearson bivariate correlations were run to examine the relationship between 
eating disorder symptom severity and decision-making performance within the group 
with BN and within the group with BED. This analysis revealed one significant and 
strong negative correlation within the BN group between average weekly frequency of 
inappropriate compensatory behaviors and performance on the A-DMC Applying 
Decision Rules subtest (r=-.719, p<.001) such that, as frequency of symptoms 
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increased, performance on the Applying Decision Rules subtest decreased. No 
significant correlation was identified between average weekly frequency of binge-
eating episodes and decision-making performance within the BED group.     
Table 6  
Group Differences on the A-DMC Subtests 
  
CG 
 
 
BN 
 
 
BED 
 
 
F 
 
p 
 
Resistance to Framing n=83 n=21 n=7   
M 1.00 .701 .694 6.506 .002 
SD (.434) (.370) (.422)   
 
Consistency in Risk Perception n=83 n=21 n=7   
M .730 .774 .714 2.939 .057 
SD (.086) (.083) (.056)   
 
Applying Decision Rules n=83 n=21 n=7   
M .758 .784 .791 .418 .660 
SD (.143) (.126) (.105)   
A-DMC= Adult Decision-Making Competence Index. CG= Control Group. BN= 
Bulimia Nervosa. BED= Binge- Eating Disorder. M= Mean. SD= Standard Deviation.  
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CHAPTER IV 
  
DISCUSSION 
Decision Making 
There were no significant differences between the groups on any of the 
computerized decision-making tasks including the IGT, GDT, and BART. These results 
do not support our primary hypotheses that women with BN and BED would perform 
significantly worse on decision-making tasks in which low risk is associated with 
higher-quality decision-making (e.g., the GDT and the IGT) nor do they support the 
secondary hypothesis that women with BN and BED would possibly perform even 
better than controls on a decision-making task in which high risk is associated with 
higher-quality decision making (e.g., the BART). Further, these results are inconsistent 
with a number of previous studies that have found individuals with eating disorders to 
perform significantly worse than individuals without eating disorders on computerized 
decision-making tasks including the IGT and the GDT (Boeka & Lokken, 2006; Brand 
et al., 2007; Brogan et al., 2010; Brogan et al., 2011; Cavedini et al., 2004; Cavedini et 
al., 2006; Danner et al., 2011;  Liao et al., 2009; Svaldi et al., 2010;  Tchanturia et al., 
2007). More specifically, a number of previous studies have found women with BN 
(Boeka & Lokken, 2006; Brand et al., 2007; Brogan et al., 2010; Liao et al., 2009) and 
women with BED (Danner et al., 2011; Svaldi et al., 2010) to perform more poorly on 
the IGT and the GDT compared to controls. 
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The current study was different from many of the previous studies, particularly 
in recruitment. While one study recruited college students (Boeka & Lokken, 2006), the 
remaining studies utilized primarily clinical and/or community samples (Brand et al., 
2007; Brogan et al., 2010; Danner et al., 2011; Liao et al., 2009; Svaldi et al., 2010). 
The current study sample consisted of primarily female psychology undergraduate 
students. It is possible that the sample that was recruited for this study, which included 
primarily individuals who were functioning well enough to be attending college, was 
functioning better than samples that included individuals who were distressed or 
impaired enough to seek mental health services. However, scores from the BDI-II, 
which is a measure of depressive symptoms and is often used as a general measure of 
psychological impairment, appear to be similar between women with BN in the current 
study and women from previous studies that found decision-making differences using 
college (e.g., M=15.50; Boeka & Lokken, 2006) and clinical (M=18.6; Laio et al., 
2009) samples. On the other hand, the mean BDI-II score of women with BED in the 
current study (M=8.00) appears to be lower than previous studies that included a 
clinical sample of women with BED (M=16.1), suggesting that the BED group used in 
the current study may have been less psychologically impaired than in previous studies. 
Age and education level, variables that have been found to be related to decision-
making performance in previous studies (e.g., Davis et al., 2008; Henninger et al., 
2010), appear to be similar for the BN and BED groups used in the current study and 
the BN and BED groups in previous studies that identified decision-making differences. 
Furthermore, it is possible that the discrepancy between the current study and previous 
studies that have found decision-making differences has to do with the fact that a 
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number of previous studies have compared clinical (inpatient or outpatient) eating 
disorder groups who were distressed/and or impaired enough to be seeking mental 
health services to controls recruited from the community.    
Further, the current study differs from previous studies examining decision-
making performance and eating disorders in that eating disorder status (e.g., diagnosis 
of BN or BED) was assessed using diagnostic criteria from the DSM-5, versus the 
DSM-IV-TR, which is less stringent in that the frequency requirement for inappropriate 
compensatory behaviors and/or binge-eating episodes has been reduced (e.g., from 
twice- weekly to once a week on average for both BN and BED). Evaluation of the 
eating disorder symptom severity of the sample used in the current study revealed that 
the BN group’s average weekly frequency of inappropriate compensatory behaviors 
(M=5.38, SD=3.598) is indicative of symptoms that are moderate in severity according 
to DSM-5 criteria regarding BN symptom severity ratings. Further, the BED group’s 
average weekly frequency of binge-eating episodes (M=2.86, SD=.900) was indicative 
of only mild symptoms. It is possible that the eating disorder symptoms reported by the 
BN and BED groups in the current sample were less severe than previous studies that 
used the more stringent DSM-IV-TR criteria. Some studies have found a relationship 
between eating disorder symptom severity and decision making including the current 
study in which Pearson bivariate correlation analysis revealed a very strong and 
negative correlation (r=-.719, p<.001) between eating disorder symptoms (i.e., total 
average weekly inappropriate compensatory behaviors) and performance on the A-
DMC Applying Decision Rules subtest within the BN group. Thus, differences in 
eating disorder symptom severity may have contributed to the discrepancy between the 
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insignificant between-group differences on decision making found in the current study 
and significant between-group decision-making differences identified in previous 
studies. Further, it is possible that the discrepancy between the results of the current 
study and the results of previous studies that detected decision-making differences 
between individuals with eating disorders compared to those without eating disorders 
may be due to sampling error such that the sample means of the current study do not 
approach the population means.  
 Some might argue that the discrepancy between the findings from this study 
and previous studies that identified significant decision-making differences is the result 
of using measures with poor psychometrics. However, the measures that were utilized 
in this study to assess eating disorder diagnoses (e.g., EDDS) and decision-making 
performance (i.e., IGT, GDT, BART, A-DMC) appear to be reliable and valid (see 
Methods section) and have been used in previous research. Moreover, a number of 
studies have found group decision-making differences using these measures (e.g., 
Brand et al., 2007; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Cavedini et al., 2004; Henninger et al., 
2010).  
However, the findings from this study are consistent with two previous studies 
that did not find significant differences between patients with eating disorders (AN and 
BN) and controls on decision-making tasks administered via computer (Bosanac et al., 
2007; Guillame et al., 2010). Though significant decision-making differences as 
measured by the IGT were not detected between a clinical sample of women with 
eating disorders compared to a group of women without eating disorder by Bosanac et 
al. (2007), their analysis was inadequately powered to detect group differences on 
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decision-making measures. Similar limitations with low power were observed in the 
current study. A priori power analysis with a desired power of .80 and an effect size of 
.4 with three groups indicated that a total sample size of 66 (22 participants per group) 
was needed for the current study. Though the total sample size was adequate (N=111), 
the group sizes were unequal (CG=83; BN=21; BED=7) with the smallest group 
containing only 7 participants. With the exception of the A-DMC Resistance to 
Framing subtest (observed power=.831; partial η2= .014) , inadequate power was 
observed (1-β <.8) for analysis of variance on the measures of decision making 
including the IGT overall net score (observed power= .175; partial η2= .014), IGT 
ending balance (observed power= .198; partial η2= .016; ), GDT overall net score 
(observed power= .079; partial η2=.003 ), GDT ending balance (observed power= .262; 
partial η2=.022 ) , BART adjusted average pump count scores (observed power= .171; 
partial η2=.013 ), A-DMC Consistency in Risk Perception subtest score (observed 
power= .512; partial η2= .046), and A-DMC Applying Decision Rules subtest score 
(observed power= .116; partial η2=.008 ). Thus, it appears that the majority of analyses 
run for the current study were inadequately powered to detect between-group 
differences had such differences existed. Furthermore, a number of studies that have 
used larger groups, many with groups of more than 20 participants, have found 
differences between groups with AN and BN and groups without eating disorders 
(Boeka & Lokken, 2006; Brand et al., 2007; Brogan et al., 2010; Cavedini et al., 2004; 
Cavedini et al., 2006; Liao et al., 2009), and it is possible that the discrepancy between 
the current study and these previous studies has to do with differences in effect sizes 
(e.g., the current study had observed effect sizes that were lower than these previous 
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studies) and power. On the other hand, it should be considered that, for many of the 
between-group analyses of decision making, the BN group trended toward performing 
better than the CG on decision-making tasks.           
Guillame et al. (2010) also failed to find significant group differences on 
decision making as measured by the IGT between a clinical sample of women with BN 
and women with AN compared to women without eating disorders. The authors of this 
study argued that their failure to find significant between-group differences on 
decision-making tasks may have been due to differences in patient characteristics 
between their study and previous studies (Guillame et al., 2010). Specifically, their 
study excluded medicated and depressed individuals on the basis that these variables 
may affect decision-making performance and that medication and depression status 
may have been potential confounds in previous studies that identified significant 
decision-making differences between women with eating disorders and controls. The 
current study differs from the study by Guillame et al. (2010) in that, though 
medication status and depression symptoms were assessed, participants were not 
excluded on these bases based on the argument that doing so may have lessened the 
generalizability of the study. However, only a small percentage (6.3%) of the sample 
reported currently taking SSRIs for the present study, and an independent samples t-test 
did not reveal significant differences on any of the decision-making measures between 
participants currently taking SSRIs and those not taking SSRIs. This is similar to 
previous studies that assessed medication status but failed to detect significant decision-
making differences between participants taking SSRIs and those who were not taking 
medication (Tchanturia et al., 2007). The mean depression level as measured by the 
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BDI-II was higher in the BN group than the CG and the BED group for the current 
study, which is consistent with previous research (Boeka & Lokken, 2006; Liao et al., 
2009; Tchanturia et al., 2007). However, Pearson bivariate correlation analysis did not 
reveal a significant correlation between depression level and any of the decision-
making measures within the BN group for the current study. This is also consistent with 
Boeka and Lokken (2006) who failed to find a significant relationship between 
depression level and decision-making performance despite finding a significantly 
higher level of depression in college women with BN compared to controls. Thus, 
although depression was significantly higher in the BN group, it was not found to be 
related to decision-making in the current study.   
The group with BN performed significantly lower than the CG on the A-DMC 
Resistance to Framing subtest. The A-DMC Resistance to Framing subtest is designed 
to evaluate whether differences in the way a problem is presented or framed affect the 
examinee’s value assessment. Performance on this task is evaluated by the extent to 
which the examinee is able to resist being influenced by the way the question is framed 
in their assessment of the value of that question. For this particular task, a lower score 
is indicative of better decision-making performance. Thus, the BN group performed 
significantly better than the CG on this task and was better able to resist being 
influenced by the framing of questions. This is the first study that the researchers are 
aware of in which women with BN performed significantly better than controls on a 
decision-making measure. Although there do not appear to be any previous studies that 
have examined decision-making differences in individuals with eating disorders using 
the A-DMC subtests specifically, this particular finding contradicts the general findings 
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of several previous studies that have found groups with eating disorders to perform 
significantly worse compared to controls on computer-administered decision-making 
tasks (Boeka & Lokken, 2006; Brand et al., 2007; Brogan et al., 2010; Brogan et al., 
2011; Cavedini et al., 2004; Cavedini et al., 2006; Danner et al., 2011;  Liao et al., 
2009; Svaldi et al., 2010;  Tchanturia et al., 2007) or that have found no differences 
between the groups with eating disorders and those without eating disorders (Bosanac 
et al., 2007; Guillame et al., 2010). It is important to note the apparent differences in 
cognitive-processing demands between the computerized decision-making tasks (e.g., 
the IGT, GDT, and the BART) and the pencil-and-paper administered A-DMC subtests 
used in this study. Specifically, the A-DMC subtests require the participant to read and 
integrate information after having been presented with a number of written scenarios 
before coming to a decision. Thus, these subtests appear to require a much greater 
degree of cognitive processing and working memory capacity than the IGT, GDT, or 
the BART and, arguably, are more generalizable to real-world decision making. This 
makes the finding that the BN group performed significantly better than the CG on one 
of the A-DMC subtests in the current study particularly noteworthy.      
Age, Education Level, and Cognitive Ability 
All three groups were similar in age, education level, and estimated cognitive 
ability as measured by the WAIS-IV Vocabulary subtest, which are factors that have 
been found to be associated with decision-making performance (i.e., Danner, 
Hagemann, Schankin, Hager, & Funke, 2011; Davis et al., 2008; Henninger et al., 
2010). Further, there were no significant differences between the groups in terms of 
negative consequences of substance use, which has also been found to be related to 
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decision-making performance (Bechara et al., 2001; Bechara & Damasio, 2002), and 
individuals who had entered treatment for substance abuse or dependence were 
excluded from the study to further protect the current study from threats to internal 
validity. Thus, these factors do not appear to explain differences in decision making (or 
lack thereof) that were found in this study. 
Executive Function 
There were significant differences between groups on the EFI composite score 
as well as the Organization and Impulse Control scales such that the BN group scored 
significantly lower than the CG while there were no significant differences between 
either the BN and BED groups or the CG and the BED group. These differences 
suggest that the BN group was lower in terms of overall executive functioning than 
both the CG and the BED group but that the BN and BED groups and the CG and the 
BED group were similar in terms of overall executive functioning. The Organization 
scale assesses ability to carry out organized, goal-directed behavior, with higher scores 
indicating higher levels of organization and lower levels indicating lower levels of 
organization. Thus, these differences suggest that the BN group reported more 
difficulty carrying out organized or goal directed behavior than the CG and that the BN 
and BED groups and the CG and the BED group were similar in terms of organization. 
The Impulse Control scale assesses the ability to control one’s impulses as reflected by 
self-inhibition, for example, with higher scores indicating higher levels of impulse 
control and lower scores indicating lower levels of this construct. Thus, the between-
group differences that were found suggest that the BN group reported less of a tendency 
to engage in impulse control than the CG and that the BED and BN groups and the CG 
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and BED group were similar in their ability to control impulse. No group differences 
were found on the Motivational Drive, Strategic Planning, and Empathy scales 
suggesting that the BN, BED, and CG were similar in their behavioral drive and interest 
in novelty, their ability to strategically plan, and their empathy for others.  
Executive functioning is a broad and multifaceted construct, and the research 
examining cognitive performance including performance on tasks of specific 
components of executive function in women with BN and BED compared to controls is 
mixed and arguably inconclusive at present (see Van den Eynde et al., 2011, for 
review). However, the results of this study are somewhat consistent with previous 
decision making and eating disorder research that has found reduced executive 
functioning as reflected by tests of cognitive flexibility (e.g., Part B of the TMT) in 
women with BN (Brand et al., 2007), but not consistent with research that has found 
reduced executive functioning in individuals with BED (Svaldi et al., 2010) compared 
to controls. Games-Howell post-hoc testing, which is a very conservative post-hoc 
analysis used when the homogeneity of variance assumption has been violated and/or 
unequal group sizes are observed, was used to analyze between-group differences for 
these and all other variables. It is possible that using this post-hoc test contributed to a 
failure to find significant group differences between the BED group and the CG, groups 
whose sizes were largely unequal. Some studies have found correlations between 
executive function and decision-making performance in women with BN (Brand et al., 
2007), including the current study. Within the BN group, Pearson bivariate correlation 
analysis revealed that organization was strongly positively correlated with GDT overall 
net score (r=-.474, p=.030; GDT overall net score must be interpreted inversely due to 
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the use of reflection of the variable during data transformation) in the current study 
such that lower organization was associated with poorer decision making on this task. 
Further, within the BN group, impulse control was strongly positively correlated 
(r=.683, p=.001) with consistency in risk perception such that lower impulse control 
was related to poorer decision making on this task.  
Despite these differences in executive functioning between women with BN 
compared to the CG and their relationship to decision-making performance, the BN 
group performed similarly to the CG and the BED group on tasks of decision making, 
and even significantly better than the CG on one of the tasks (i.e., A-DMC Resistance 
to Framing Subtest). Thus, the results of the current study suggest that reduced 
executive functioning overall and as reflected by lower organized or goal-directed 
behavior and lower impulse control may not explain the decision-making differences 
that have been found between women with BN and CGs in previous studies.   
Impulsivity-Related Personality Traits 
There were significant differences between groups on the Negative Urgency, 
Positive Urgency, and Lack of Perseverance scales such that the BN group scored 
significantly higher than the CG while there were no significant differences between 
either the BN and the BED groups or the CG and the BED group. This suggests that the 
BN group reported a higher tendency to act impulsively in the presence of negative and 
positive emotions and more difficulty in sustaining focus on difficult or boring tasks 
than the CG but that the BN and BED groups and CG and BED group were similar on 
these impulsivity-related personality traits. These results are generally consistent with 
previous research that has found higher impulsivity in women with BN compared to 
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women without eating disorders (e.g., Brand et al., 2007; ) and studies that have found 
negative urgency specifically to be related to bulimic symptoms (Fischer, Smith, & 
Anderson, 2003). While some previous research has found trait impulsivity including 
the specific facets of sensation-seeking and urgency to be negatively correlated with 
decision-making performance in non-eating disordered individuals (Bayard, Raffard, & 
Gely-Nargeot, 2011; Brand et al., 2007; Franken, Strien, Nijs, & Muris, 2008), others 
have failed to find a significant relationship between impulsivity assessed as a unitary 
construct and decision-making performance in women with BN (e.g., Brand et al., 
2007). In the current study, lack of perseverance was strongly negatively correlated 
with IGT overall net score (r= -.510, p=.022) such that higher scores on this measure 
were associated with poorer decision-making performance within the BN group. 
Interestingly, negative urgency was strongly positively correlated with GDT ending 
balance (r=-.501, p=.021; GDT balance must be interpreted inversely as the variable 
was reflected during data transformation procedures) such that a higher tendency to act 
impulsively in the face of negative emotions was associated with better decision-
making performance within the BN group.  
Despite these differences in impulsivity-related personality traits between the 
group with BN compared to the CG and the relationships that were found between 
these traits and decision-making, the BN group performed similarly on all decision-
making tasks compared to the CG and BED group and even significantly better than the 
CG on one of the decision-making tasks (e.g., A-DMC Resistance to Framing). Thus, 
the results of the current study suggest that the decision-making differences that have 
been found in previous studies between women with BN and CGs may not be fully 
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explained by differences in impulsivity-related personality traits like negative or 
positive urgency or lack of perseverance.  
Obsessive-Compulsive Symptoms 
There were significant differences between groups on the OCI-R total score in 
that the BN group scored significantly higher than the CG while there were no 
significant differences between either the BN and BED groups or the CG and the BED 
group. Further, there were significant between-group differences on the Obsessing and 
Mental Neutralizing scales such that the BN group scored significantly higher than both 
the CG and BED group while there were no significant differences between the CG and 
the BED group. These scales measure distress pertaining to obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms and attempts to mentally-neutralize these obsessions with higher scores 
indicating more reported distress. Thus, the between-group differences found in this 
study suggest that the BN group reported higher distress regarding obsessive-
compulsive symptoms generally than the CG while the level of distress for these 
symptoms was similar for both the BN group compared to the BED group and the CG 
compared to the BED group. Further, the between-group differences found in this study 
suggest that the BN group reported higher levels of distress pertaining to obsessions 
and attempting to mentally neutralize these obsessions compared to the CG and the 
BED group while the level of distress pertaining to obsessions and mental neutralizing 
was similar for the CG compared to the BED group.  
Although there is some variability, the results of this study are generally 
consistent with epidemiological research that has found a higher rate of obsessive-
compulsive symptoms in individuals with BN than those without eating disorders in 
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community (Angst et al., 2004; Hudson et al., 2007) and in college (Roberts, 2006) 
samples. Another study found significant decision-making differences between 
individuals with OCD and controls using one measure (e.g., the IGT) and non-
significant differences using another (e.g., the GDT) (Starcke, Tuschen-Caffier, 
Markowitsch, & Brand, 2010). Some previous studies have found a negative 
relationship between some obsessive-compulsive symptoms and decision-making 
performance (e.g., Lawrence et al., 2006) including decision-making performance as 
measured by the IGT (i.e., Laio et al., 2009). Some have suggested that obsessive-
compulsive symptoms may have accounted for the decision-making differences 
between women with eating disorders compared to those without eating disorders in 
previous studies (e.g., Cavedini et al., 2006; Laio et al., 2009). However, no 
relationship was found within the BN group between those obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms on which the BN group difference and any of the decision-making tasks in 
the current study.   
Despite significant differences on distress related to obsession-compulsive 
symptoms overall and obsessing and mental neutralizing specifically between women 
with BN compared to both the CG and the BED group in the current study, the BN 
group performed similarly on tasks of decision making, and even better on one of the 
tasks (i.e. A-DMC Resistance to Framing subtest), compared to the CG. Thus, the 
results of the current study suggest that the decision-making differences that have been 
found in previous studies between women with BN compared to CGs may not be fully 
explained by differences in obsessive-compulsive symptoms. 
 
73 
 
Depression and Anxiety Symptoms 
Significant group differences were identified on depressive symptoms in the 
current study. Specifically, the BN group had a significantly higher level of depressive 
symptoms as measured by the BDI-II than both the CG and the BED group. While 
some of the previous studies examining decision making and eating disorders did not 
appear to assess depressive symptoms (Cavedini et al., 2004; Cavedini et al., 2006), the 
findings from this study are generally consistent with previous decision making and 
eating disorder studies that have assessed depressive symptoms and have found 
depressive symptom levels to be higher in groups with BN and AN (Boeka & Lokken, 
2006; Liao et al., 2009; Tchanturia et al., 2007). Some studies have found that 
depressive symptoms negatively impact decision-making performance (Murphy et al., 
2001) including performance on the IGT (Tchanturia et al., 2007), while others have 
found no relationship between depressive symptoms and decision-making performance 
in women with BN (Boeka & Lokken, 2006; Laio et al., 2009). Pearson bivariate 
correlation analysis did not reveal a significant correlation between depression level 
and any of the decision-making measures within the BN group in the current study. 
Though the BN group had a significantly higher level of depressive symptoms 
compared to both the CG and the BED group in this study, the BN group was similar to 
the CG and the BED group on the measures of decision making, and even significantly 
better on one task (i.e., A-DMC Resistance to Framing Subtest). It should be 
considered that the mean depressive symptom level (M=17.43) as measured by the 
BDI-II in the BN group is indicative of depressive symptoms that are only mild in 
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severity, which is similar to the BDI-II scores of college women with BN in another 
recent study (e.g., M=15.50; Boeka & Lokken, 2006).  
Additionally, there were significant group differences on anxiety symptoms 
identified in the current study. Specifically, the BN group had a significantly higher 
level of anxiety symptoms as measured by the BAI than both the CG and the BED 
group while the CG and the BED group were similar in terms of anxiety symptom 
levels. This is consistent with previous research that has found higher rates of anxiety 
symptoms and disorders in individuals with BN (Kaye, Bulik, Thornton, Barbarich, & 
Masters, 2004). While some of the previous studies examining decision making 
performance in groups with eating disorders assessed obsessive-compulsive symptoms 
specifically (e.g., Laio et al., 2009), they did not assess other, more general types of 
anxiety symptoms. Some studies have found that anxiety symptoms impact decision-
making performance including performance on the IGT (Miu, Heilman, & Houser, 
2008), and other studies have found anxiety symptoms to result in greater risk-
avoidance in decision-making tasks (Maner et al., 2007; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). 
In the current study, Pearson bivariate correlation analysis revealed strong positive 
correlations between the BAI and IGT overall net score (r=.510, p=.018) and IGT 
ending balance (r=.600, p=.004) within the BN group such that higher anxiety 
symptoms were associated with better decision-making performance on these tasks. 
Thus, one might have even expected the BN group to have performed better on the 
tasks in which higher-quality decision making was associated with lower risk taking 
(e.g., IGT, GDT) and worse on tasks in which higher-quality decision making was 
reflected by higher risk taking (e.g., the BART).  
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 Despite the fact that the BN group had a significantly higher level of anxiety 
symptoms compared to both the CG and the BED group that were found to be related to 
better decision-making performance on some tasks, the BN group performed similarly 
on all decision making (IGT, GDT, and BART) irrespective of how decision-making 
quality was determined (i.e., higher-quality reflected by lower risk taking or higher 
quality reflected by higher-risk taking). It should be noted that the mean anxiety 
symptom level (M=14.71) as measured by the BAI in the BN group from this study is 
indicative of only mild anxiety symptoms. Future research should seek to examine the 
role of anxiety symptoms, especially as they relate to in-the-moment decision-making 
performance in individuals with eating disorders.   
Conclusion 
In sum, the results of this study suggest similar decision-making performance in 
a sample of primarily college women with BN and BED compared to controls despite 
significant differences on other variables that have been found to or appear to be 
theoretically related to decision-making (e.g., executive functioning, impulsivity-
related personality traits and obsessive-compulsive symptoms as well as other anxiety 
and depression symptoms). In fact, the BN group demonstrated significantly better 
performance on one of the pencil-and-paper decision-making tasks that arguably 
requires more cognitive effort (i.e., A-DMC Resistance to Framing Subtest) than the 
computerized tasks (e.g., the IGT, GDT, and BART). It should be noted that the 
majority of the analyses that were run to examine decision-making performance 
differences were inadequately powered to detect between-group differences had such 
differences existed. Future studies should seek to replicate these findings using larger 
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samples. Furthermore, future research should seek to examine interactions between in-
the-moment negative affect (e.g., depressed mood and anxiety states) and impulsivity-
related personality traits and executive functioning on decision-making in women with 
eating disorders. 
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